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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: 
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND POLICY REINVENTION IN U.S. STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay, or Chapter 2, advances 
the literature by examining the conditional effects of lobbying on the relationship 
between policy learning and policy reinvention. Scholars have consistently shown that 
learning of successful policies in other states leads to higher likelihood of policy adoption. 
This essay extends this finding two ways. First, policy learning can also lead to more 
comprehensive adoption of successful policies. Second, the effect of policy learning on 
policy comprehensiveness is conditional on lobbying by interest groups, an alternative 
source of information about policy success. To test these hypotheses, I conduct a directed 
dyad-year analysis using a dataset on American state drunk driving regulations from 1983 
to 2000. The results show that more comprehensive policy adoption by states is positively 
related to policy success in other states when lobbying by Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving (MADD) is relatively low. Moreover, lobbying by MADD increases policy 
comprehensiveness when policy success is relatively low.  
The second essay, or Chapter 3, examines the effects of GASB 45 on local 
government borrowing costs. Government financial disclosure is a key instrument to 
improve fiscal transparency and accountability. In 2004, the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB) issued Statement No. 45 to require state and local governments 
to disclose information about other postemployment benefits (OPEB) for the first time. 
The theoretical framework incorporates both direct and indirect effects of disclosure on 
borrowing costs. The empirical tests use a panel of counties across states and the bonds 
they issued in the primary market between 1999 and 2012. To account for the impact of 
GASB 45 on county governments’ decisions to issue bonds, a Heckman selection model 
is estimated. GASB 45 increases borrowing costs of county governments, with the effects 
decreasing over time. GASB 45 has a larger effect on borrowing costs of county 
governments issuing bonds of lower credit quality and adopting the generally accepted 
accounting standards (GAAP).  
The third essay, or Chapter 4, examines the impact of information about funding 
of OPEB plans on borrowing costs of local governments. Local governments have 
disclosed information about other postemployment benefits (OPEB) plans under the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 45 issued in 2004. Funding 
status is measured by percentage of annual required contribution (ARC) contributed and 
funded ratios. Two panels of counties and cities with comprehensive annual financial 
reports available from the Government Financial Officers Association are matched with 
the bonds they issued between 2008 and 2014. The results show that higher percentage of 
ARC contributed of OPEB plans are associated with lower borrowing costs for counties; 
and higher OPEB funded ratios are correlated with lower borrowing costs for cities. 
Higher percentage of ARC contributed and funded ratios of pension plans are associated 
with lower borrowing costs for both counties and cities. This essay demonstrates that 
information about OPEB and pension plans is incorporated in municipal bond pricing. 
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Chapter 1 Overview 
In this dissertation, I study diffusion of state public health policies as well as 
financial disclosure of local retiree healthcare benefits. The theme of this dissertation is to 
examine the role of information in policy-making. The dissertation consists of three 
essays. While the first essay examines the role of policy success information in the policy 
diffusion process, the second and third essays examine the impacts of fiscal information 
disclosed under GASB 45 on bond pricing in the municipal bond market.  
In the first essay (Chapter 2), Learning, Lobbying, and Policy Reinvention: An 
Examination of Drunk Driving Laws in U.S. States, I explore factors affecting the change 
of drunk driving policies being diffused at the state level, a different focus than 
traditional diffusion studies. I focus on the interactive effects of policy success and 
lobbying on policy comprehensiveness. The literature has rarely examined the 
relationship between information about policy success and information from lobbying by 
interest groups in the policy diffusion process.  
In the second and third essays, I examine the impact of financial information 
about other postemployment benefit (OPEB) plans disclosed under the Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 45 on municipal borrowing costs. In 
the second essay (Chapter 3), I examine the effects of GASB 45’s requirement of 
financial disclosure about OPEB plans on borrowing costs of counties and cities. I find 
that counties and cities required to disclose under GASB 45 pay lower borrowing costs, 
with the effects decreasing over time.   
In the third essay (Chapter 4), Does OPEB Funding Impact Municipal Borrowing 
Costs?, I turn to examining the effects of reported information about funding status of 
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OPEB plans on county and city government borrowing costs. I also study the impact of 
pension funding along with OPEB funding for the first time. The results show that 
counties and cities with better funding status of OPEB and pension plans pay lower 
borrowing costs. Taken together, these two essays analyze the intended and actual policy 
consequences of financial disclosure of local government OPEB obligations, an 
important but under-studied issue in the literature.  
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Chapter 2 Lobbying, Learning, and Policy Reinvention: An Examination of 
the American States’ Drunk Driving Laws 
Introduction 
Policy diffusion studies have found consistently that policy success is positively 
associated with state adoption of policy innovations, which provides evidence for policy 
learning (Volden, 2006; Gilardi and Füglister, 2008; Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet, 2009; 
Shipan and Volden, 2014; Butler et al., 2015; Nicholson-Crotty and Carley, 2016). While 
many policy diffusion studies treat policies being diffused as an undifferentiated whole, 
policy reinvention scholars argue that policies can be changed by later adopters in 
diffusion process (Clark, 1985). This critical difference raises the question of whether 
policy learning works as a mechanism of policy reinvention. Mooney and Lee (1999) 
propose that policy success can influence policy reinvention. Nonetheless, empirical tests 
of this proposition have been absent in the literature.  
Moreover, both policy diffusion and policy reinvention studies have examined 
internal and external factors of the policy making process. Yet little is known about how 
such nongovernmental actors as interest groups interact with policymakers to influence 
policy adoption. Equipped with resources to collect policy-relevant information, both 
interest groups and policymakers have ideas about whether to adopt a policy and what 
policy to adopt. Interest groups can lobby policymakers by making political contributions 
or providing policy-relevant information. In addition to influencing policy adoption, this 
may change the incentives and strategies for policymakers to learn about policy 
innovations in other states. While several studies have examined the roles of interest 
groups in policy diffusion process (Balla, 2001; Haider-Markel, 2001; Garrett and Jansa, 
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2015), it remains unclear whether interest groups influence policy reinvention and to 
what extent interest groups may change the calculus of policy learning by policymakers.    
This study investigates the impact of policy learning on policy reinvention and 
how lobbying moderates this impact. In the policy diffusion process, lobbying by interest 
groups can change the incentives of policymakers to learn and what information to learn. 
Interest groups can change legislators’ incentives to learn by making political 
contributions or providing policy-relevant information. Moreover, this policy-relevant 
information can change the composition of information that policymakers may obtain 
from lobbying or their own learning. As lobbying increases, legislators’ learning of 
policy success information can have either stronger or weaker impact on policy 
reinvention. The empirical tests with state policies on driving under influence (DUI) 
show that learning of policy success from other states leads to more comprehensive 
adoption when lobbying by Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) is relatively low. 
Lobbying by MADD increases policy comprehensiveness when policy success in other 
states is relatively low.  
This study enhances our understanding of policy making processes several ways. 
First, it provides empirical evidence that policy learning works as a mechanism for policy 
reinvention as well as policy diffusion. Information about policy success not only 
influences adoption of a single policy but also the changes of policies being diffused. By 
focusing on a substantively different policy issue, state drunk driving laws, this study 
extends the external validity of previous findings of policy learning as a mechanism of 
policy diffusion. Second, it shows that interest groups influence policy reinvention. This 
adds to the previous finding that interest groups influence policy diffusion (Balla, 2001; 
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Haider-Markel, 2001; Garrett and Jansa, 2015). Third, it shows that interest groups do 
interact with policymakers in policy diffusion processes. Lobbying by interest groups 
substitutes for learning of policy success information in other states by policymakers. 
This indicates that influence of interest groups constitutes an important condition under 
which policy learning occurs. This also suggests that interest groups play a significant 
role in determining whether and how states serve as “policy laboratories”.  
Previous Research 
Policy reinvention is a process in which later adopters make changes to a policy 
innovation. Rogers (2003:180) defined policy reinvention as “the degree to which an 
innovation is changed or modified by the user in the process of its adoption and 
implementation”. A key dimension of the change is how a policy shrinks or expands in its 
scope. As Rice and Rogers (1980: 501) put it, “an innovation is often really a bundle of 
components; it is possible to adopt some components and change or reject others”. In 
many policy reinvention studies, the dependent variable is such characteristics as the 
“comprehensiveness” or “intensiveness” of policies being diffused (Clark, 1985; Glick 
and Hays, 1991; Hays, 1996a; Kim and Jennings, 2012). Policy comprehensiveness can 
also be interpreted as the degree of stringency or generosity of policies. Scholars have 
examined the factors that move policy reinvention toward or away from 
comprehensiveness. Among these factors are public support (Mooney and Lee, 1999) and 
level of controversy of policy issues (Hays, 1996b). Nonetheless, there has been no 
empirical investigation of the effects of policy learning on policy reinvention.   
Previous studies on policy learning and policy diffusion have focused on the 
effects of policy success (Volden, 2006; Gilardi and Füglister, 2008; Gilardi, Füglister, 
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and Luyet, 2009; Shipan and Volden, 2014; Butler et al., 2015; Nicholson-Crotty and 
Carley, 2016). They consistently found that policy success of earlier adopters is 
positively correlated with policy diffusion. This correlation indicates the existence of 
policy learning, which by itself is unobservable. As Shipan and Volden (2014: 360) 
argued, “the clearest evidence of learning arises when the success of policies helps to 
determine whether or not they spread from one government to another.” In addition, this 
literature has recently converged to examine conditional effects of policy learning on 
policy diffusion. While scholars have focused on such conditions as ability to learn 
(Shipan and Volden, 2014; Nicholson-Crotty and Carley, 2016), this study examines 
lobbying by interest groups as an alternative source of policy-relevant information for 
policymakers.  
Interest groups have been found to influence policy diffusion. For instance, 
national professional associations (Balla, 2001) and campaign by interest groups (Haider-
Markel, 2001) increase states’ adoption of policy innovations. Garrett and Jansa (2015) 
showed interest groups play a central role in policy diffusion networks by providing 
model legislation. These studies identify the provision of policy information or expertise 
as a mechanism through which interest groups influence policy diffusion. However, they 
do not examine how this mechanism interacts with policy learning.  
Learning and Policy Reinvention 
Policy learning is a key mechanism of policy diffusion (Shipan and Volden, 2008). 
Theoretically, policy learning starts with a policy experiment that reveals information of 
the relation between a policy and its consequences. Callander (2011) modeled learning as 
a process of searching by trial and error. Policymakers typically have imperfect 
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knowledge about how policies map into outcomes. Specifically, “they know which 
policies are more likely to produce liberal (or conservative) outcomes even if they do not 
know which policies do produce outcomes in that direction” (Callander, 2011: 646). To 
know the realized outcomes of a policy, policymakers must experiment with that policy. 
Whether successes or failures, the policy experimentation revels invaluable information 
about policy outcomes. This information becomes a public good so that other 
policymakers who have not experimented can learn it.  
By policy experiment, policymakers can accumulate factual knowledge about 
how a policy maps into its consequences. This helps them know more about the mapping, 
but never everything about the mapping (Callander, 2011). It is impossible for 
policymakers to pin down the causal effect of a policy on a single outcome, no matter 
whether they experiment with that policy. If multiple policy innovations generate the 
same or similar outcomes (Shipan and Volden, 2014), policymakers who have not 
experimented can at best learn which bundle of policy components is correlated with 
which group of policy outcomes.  
Thus, the output of policy learning is policy reinvention in the form of multiple 
policy components. Because it is infeasible for policymakers to learn the exact outcome 
of a policy, it is unrealistic to model the output of policy learning as adoption of a single 
policy. Though many studies measure the output of policy learning with a binary variable 
of policy adoption, that variable captures indirectly multiple policy changes (Volden, 
2006; Gilardi and Füglister, 2008; Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet, 2009; Shipan and Volden, 
2014). This is consistent with the proposition that policy learning happens at the 
aggregate level of a group of policy components instead of any single policy component. 
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Moreover, conceptualizing the output of policy learning as policy reinvention has the 
advantage of explicitly modelling multiple policy changes.  
If policymakers learn from policy innovations to adopt successful policy 
components, policy success will have a positive effect on policy reinvention. Observing 
which set of policies is associated with better outcomes, policymakers can “see which set 
of policies is most likely to be effective at home and then adopt only those policies” 
(Shipan and Volden, 2014: 361). Given that the output of policy learning is to adopt a 
larger number of successful policy components, policies will become more 
comprehensive in the diffusion process (Hays 1996b; Mooney and Lee 1999). Thus, the 
first hypothesis follows.    
Policy Learning Hypothesis: Policies become more comprehensive over time 
when earlier adoptions show policy success. 
Lobbying and Policy Learning 
Lobbying is attempts by interest groups to influence policy making. As Grasse 
and Heidbreder (2011) summarize, interest groups play three roles in influencing policy 
making, including political contributors, information providers, and legislative 
subsidizers. Each role has significant implications for interaction between lobbying by 
interest groups and policy learning by legislators in policy diffusion process. First, 
interest groups make political contributions to legislators in exchange for favorable 
policies or access to legislators. According to one view, a political contribution is to “buy” 
legislative votes (Langbein and Lotwis, 1990; Stratmann, 1991; Stratmann, 1998; 
Stratmann, 2002). Another view, in contrast, maintains that a political contribution is to 
“buy” access to legislators (Austen-Smith, 1995; Lohmann, 1995; Cotton, 2012). Access 
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then allows interest groups to provide policy-relevant information to influence legislative 
decisions.  
In either case, interest groups can influence policy learning by legislators. On one 
hand, if political contributions do exchange for favorable policies, they can substitute for 
policy learning by legislators. If legislators have decided to adopt a policy under the 
influence of political contributions, they would have weaker incentives to learn from 
policy innovations in other states. At one extreme, if political contributions dictate 
adoption of a policy by legislators, policy learning would become irrelevant because 
legislators would adopt that policy as preferred by interest groups regardless of policy 
success in other states. This suggests that information about policy success in other states 
should have smaller impact on policy reinvention as the influence of political 
contributions becomes stronger. On the other hand, if political contributions only 
exchange for access to a legislator, they should influence policy learning indirectly 
through their impact on informational lobbying. Existing models of lobbying generally 
predict that political contributions increase lobbying by interest groups (Austen-Smith, 
1995; Lohmann, 1995; Cotton, 2012). Thus, the impact of political contributions on 
policy learning depends on how informational lobbying influences policy learning.   
Second, in conventional models of informational lobbying, an interest group 
provides policy-relevant information to persuade legislators to adopt its favored policies. 
These models share the same proposition that interest groups provide information to 
inform legislators, to update their policy beliefs, or to change their policy preferences 
(Austen-Smith, 1993; Austen-Smith and Wright, 1994; Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2006; 
Schnakenberg, 2017). Lobbying is thus persuasion with information provision. If this 
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proposition holds, informational lobbying can influence policy learning by legislators 
through changing their incentives to learn and what to learn. Like political contributions, 
information provided by interest groups can substitute for information search by 
legislators. If interest groups succeed in convincing a legislator to adopt a policy they 
prefer, that legislator should have weaker incentives to learn from policy success in other 
states on their own. When informational lobbying has predominant impact on policy 
adoption, policy learning by legislators themselves would become redundant because 
they would have known whether they want to adopt a policy and what that policy would 
be.   
This does not necessarily, however, lead to less importance of policy success 
information. Unlike political contributions, informational lobbying provides legislators an 
alternative source of policy-relevant information to their own information search. Even if 
they reduce their own information search, legislators may still obtain policy success 
information from lobbying by interest groups. To the extent that policy success 
information is used by interest groups to persuade legislators, it can become either more 
or less important for policy reinvention. Both informational lobbying and policy learning 
can provide legislators multiple types of information. Interest groups may provide 
legislators policy success information along with other information about a policy. For 
example, they may provide such information as the level of constituent support and 
distribution of costs and benefits for a policy. Similarly, besides policy success, 
policymakers may learn about desirability of policy goals or viability of policy 
instruments, and political or policy outcomes of policy innovations (Gilardi, 2010). If it 
happens that interest groups manage to convince legislators with predominantly policy 
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success information, policy success should have larger impact on policy reinvention as 
informational lobbying increases. On the other hand, if policy success information only 
constitutes a small proportion in informational lobbying, policy success should become 
less important in policy reinvention as informational lobbying increases.  
Third, while the models of informational lobbying treat lobbying as persuasion, 
Hall and Deardorff (2006) model lobbying as legislative subsidy. To make progress on 
multiple policy issues at a time, legislators maximize utility under the budget constraints 
of information, service, or expertise. For legislators, interest groups serve as a “service 
bureau” or “adjuncts to staff” by providing issue-specific, customized information on a 
policy issue. Legislators’ budget constraints are thus relaxed and they are induced to 
make more progress on that policy issue than on others.  
In the model of lobbying as legislative subsidy, interest groups can provide 
policy-relevant information or resources to obtain such information as preferred by 
legislators. In either case, legislators can choose how much to learn about policy success 
as they prefer when additional resources become available due to lobbying. These 
additional resources may increase or decrease learning of policy success by legislators. If 
legislators prefer more information about policy success but have no sufficient resources 
to learn without the legislative subsidy from lobbying, they should learn more about 
policy success when their budget constraints are relaxed by lobbying. Consequently, 
policy success information should have larger impact on policy reinvention as lobbying 
increases. On the other hand, if legislators prefer less policy success information and a 
balanced bundle of multiple types of policy information, they may diversify their 
information bundle by reducing the proportion of policy success information with 
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additional resources from lobbying. This may reflect the possibility that, without 
lobbying, policy success information is essential for legislators while other information is 
too “expensive” to obtain under their budget constraints. In this case, policy success 
information should have smaller impact on policy reinvention as lobbying increases.  
In sum, lobbying should influence policy reinvention in the direction preferred by 
interest groups. No matter whether interest groups influence policymaking through 
making political contributions or providing policy-relevant information, they should 
influence decisions of policy adoptions if they succeed. Moreover, previous studies 
(Balla, 2001; Haider-Markel, 2001; Garrett and Jansa, 2015) have found that interest 
groups influence policy diffusion. In parallel, interest groups may influence the 
comprehensiveness of policy reinvention if they can influence the adoption of individual 
policy components. It depends on the policy preferences of interest groups whether 
lobbying increases or decreases policy comprehensiveness. If interest groups prefer 
legislators to adopt more policy components, lobbying should increase policy 
comprehensiveness. If interest groups prefer legislators to adopt fewer components 
because they stand against the policy, lobbying should decrease policy 
comprehensiveness should it succeed. Thus, the Lobbying Hypothesis follows. 
Lobbying Hypothesis: Lobbying increases policy comprehensiveness if interest 
groups lobby for the policy and decreases policy comprehensiveness if interest groups 
lobby against the policy.  
In addition, lobbying can influence both legislators’ incentives of policy learning 
and what information to learn in policy diffusion process. Information about policy 
success in other states can become more important for policy reinvention in two cases. 
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First, per the models of informational lobbying as persuasion, interest groups may 
provide mainly policy success information to persuade legislators and thus make such 
information more important for policy reinvention. Since political contributions can 
increase informational lobbying, this may reflect both a direct effect of informational 
lobbying and an indirect effect of political contributions. Second, in the model of 
lobbying as legislative subsidy, legislators can choose to learn more about policy success 
as more resources become available. Thus, lobbying and policy learning reinforce each 
other. The Lobbying and Policy Learning Hypothesis A follows.  
Lobbying and Policy Learning Hypothesis A: Policy success has a stronger 
effect on policy comprehensiveness when lobbying is relatively high; lobbying has a 
stronger effect on policy comprehensiveness when policy success is relatively high. 
Under other conditions, the three groups of lobbying models imply that policy 
success information can become less important in policy reinvention. If political 
contributions succeed in exchanging for policies favored by interest groups, legislators 
should learn less about policy success information or any policy-relevant information. Per 
models of informational lobbying as persuasion, policy success information should 
become less important if interest groups convince a legislator to adopt their favored 
policies with a bundle of information in which policy success information is marginal. In 
the model of lobbying as legislative subsidy, legislators can choose to learn less of policy 
success information and more of other information to diversify their information mix 
given additional resources to learn from lobbying. Therefore, lobbying and policy success 
are substitutes for each other. The Lobbying and Policy Learning Hypothesis B follows.  
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Lobbying and Policy Learning Hypothesis B: Policy success has a stronger 
effect on policy comprehensiveness when lobbying is relatively low; lobbying has a 
stronger effect on policy comprehensiveness when policy success is relatively low. 
State DUI Laws and Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) 
This study uses state DUI laws as an empirical setting to test the three hypotheses 
of lobbying, learning, and policy reinvention. The data on these DUI laws come from 
“State Health Policy Research Dataset: 1980-2010”, a data set released by the 
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR34789). The data 
contain information of the year when states adopted alcohol and drunk driving laws from 
1980 to 2010. Using this data set, Macinko and Silver (2015) found first-time and 
second-time adoptions of DUI laws by a state are affected by its neighboring states’ 
adoption. This effect may result from either policy diffusion or similar responses to 
regional policy problems (Volden, Ting, and Carpenter, 2008). Focusing on policy 
learning, the current study is in a better position to examine the diffusion of state DUI 
laws.  
In the framework of policy reinvention, each state DUI law is treated as a policy 
component of the whole state DUI policy. Multiple policy components show the range of 
policy measures that state governments take to regulate drunk driving behavior, such as 
minimum fines, zero tolerance laws and minimum prison time. Each policy component is 
coded as a dummy variable; 1 indicates adoption and 0 indicates the lack of adoption. 
Each policy component is assigned equal weight. From 1982 to 2000, more states have 
adopted each policy component. Table 2.1 shows the eight components of state DUI 
policy and corresponding variable names.  
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Table 2. 1 Eight Policy Components of State DUI Policy 
Policy Components Variable Name 
Presence of a law that sets a mandatory minimum fine for first time 
DUI offenders 
Minimum fine  
Presence of a law that establishes a legal blood alcohol concentration 
(BAC) limit for underage drivers that is lower than the BAC limit for 
adult drivers 
Zero tolerance  
Presence of a law that mandates prison time for first time DUI 
offenders 
Minimum prison  
Presence of a law that prohibits open containers of alcohol, including 
beer, wine, and distilled spirits, in the passenger compartments of 
noncommercial motor vehicles 
Open container  
 
Presence of a law that sets BAC limits for adult drivers (21 years and 
older) of motor vehicles at 0.08 grams per deciliter (g/dL). 
0.08 BAC per se 
Presence of a law that mandates community service after 1st or 2nd 
conviction  
Community service 
Presence of a law that requires license suspension for first-time, pre-
conviction DUI offenders 
Pre-conviction license 
suspension 
Presence of a law that requires license suspension for first-time, post-
conviction DUI offenders 
Post-conviction 
license suspension 
Source: Macinko, James, Diana Silver, Jin Y. Bae, Geronimo Jimenez, Maggie 
Paul, and Ashley Mueller. The State Health Policy Research Dataset (SHEPRD): 1980-
2010. ICPSR34789-v2. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and 
Social Research [distributor], 2013-12-16.  
 
To test the Lobbying and Learning Hypotheses, this study focuses on lobbying by 
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) on DUI policies. Since 1980, MADD has been 
lobbying for stricter DUI legislation and is recognized as one of the major forces behind 
almost all important state DUI laws (Fell and Voas, 2006). While other organizations, 
such as Students Against Driving Drunk and Alliance Against Intoxicated Motorists, also 
lobby for DUI regulation, MADD remains “the most prominent and powerful” among 
them (Marshall and Oleson, 1994). Since these organizations belong to the same coalition 
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with MADD, focusing on MADD 1  alone might underestimate the overall impact of 
interest groups advocating for DUI regulation.  
On the other hand, interest groups in the alcohol industries, such as National Beer 
Wholesalers Association and American Beverage Institute, lobby against DUI laws. 
Nonetheless, MADD manages to avoid antagonizing the vested interests in alcohol 
industries by framing drunk driving as a problem of individual choice by drunk drivers. 
This contributes to cooperative relationships between MADD and the interest groups in 
alcohol industries, especially in 1980s and 1990s. For example, in 1983, MADD accepted 
donations from Anheuser-Busch, a large beer manufacturer (Marshall and Oleson, 1994). 
This implies that interest groups in alcohol industries are unlikely to conduct 
“counteractive lobbying” (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1994) against MADD. To the extent 
that such lobbying exists, focusing on MADD2 may overestimate the impact of interest 
groups lobbying for DUI regulation.  
Between 1982 and 2000, the number of MADD local chapters has increased by 
about six times, from 52 to 328. Over time, MADD has accumulated information and 
expertise to lobby policymakers on DUI policies. First, MADD started its “Rating the 
States” program in 1991 to provide a letter-grade score for states on multiple aspects of 
DUI policies (Russell et al, 1995). The program has helped states to learn how they 
compare with others and prompted states to adopt stricter DUI policies. Second, MADD 
has hired Gallup to conduct national surveys of public attitudes on drunk driving since 
1992 and thus obtained first-hand information on DUI policies. Third, MADD frequently 
                                                
1 While it would be ideal to study lobbying activities of multiple interest groups, 
comparable data as that for MADD are not available.  
2 Similarly, data suitable for a diffusion study are not available for interest groups 
lobbying against DUI laws.  
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serves on policy task forces or gives testimony in the legislative process of DUI policies 
(Russell et al, 1995). Fourth, in 1995, MADD “began holding Public Policy Institutes to 
train state public policy liaisons in DUI issues and legislative ‘how-to’ techniques” (Mero, 
2009:142).  
Econometric Method and Model 
Recently, analysts have used directed dyad-year event history analysis (EHA) 
widely in policy diffusion studies (Volden, 2006; Gilardi and Füglister, 2008; Gilardi, 
2010; Shipan and Volden, 2014; Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, and Miller, 2016; Nicholson-
Crotty and Carley, 2016).  The dyad-year EHA has three advantages (Volden, 2006). 
First, it allows one to explicitly incorporate the characteristic of policy being diffused, 
such as policy success. Second, while the dependent variable in traditional EHA is 
usually a dummy, the dyad-year EHA makes it feasible to study the diffusion of multiple 
policies. Third, it allows researchers to control for variables measuring similarities or 
differences between two states in addition to the characteristics of adopting states and 
states being emulated.  
The method used in this study originates from directed dyad-year EHA but differs 
slightly. The setup of the model is the same as that in a dyad-year EHA, but the 
dependent variable is measured differently in this study. While the dependent variable in 
an EHA is a dummy, the dependent variable in this study is a count of the number of 
policy components adopted by states. To account for this change, the model is estimated 
as a fixed-effect panel model at the level of dyads of states. It is not unusual to measure 
the dependent variable as an interval variable in a dyad-year model. For example, Shipan 
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and Volden (2014) measure their dependent variable as the amount of movements made 
by state A towards state B in adopting laws to limit youth smoking.  
The dyad of state A and state B differs from the dyad of state B and state A. This 
is because our hypothesis states that one state learns from the other whose policy is 
successful, but not the other way around. The unit of analysis is each pair or dyad of 
states. Given 18 years of data between 1983 and 2000, there will be 44,100 observations 
(50 states ×49 potentially emulated states ×18 years). The model is estimated with the 
control of fixed effects of dyads of states to account for the time-invariant factors within 
each pair of states over time. For example, the effects of neighboring states on policy 
adoption can be controlled in this way. Year fixed effects are also controlled to account 
for common factors that influence all states in a year. For example, the influence of 
federal government was present for the 0.08 BAC per se laws (Fell and Voas, 2006) and 
can be controlled by year fixed effects as it was the same for all states in a year. The 
standard errors are clustered by dyads of states because the error terms of the regression 
equation are possibly interdependent for each pair of states.  
In a dyad-year EHA model, the states having adopted a policy component provide 
opportunities to be emulated. Boehmke (2009) pointed out that users of dyad-year EHA 
should limit the sample to cases where learning is possible to avoid spurious findings of 
policy diffusion. The sample in this study is thus limited to the cases where policy 
learning is possible. Specifically, state B must have a policy component in year t-1 for 
policy learning by state A to become possible, no matter whether state A adopts that 
policy component in year t. This reduces the number of observations to 33,674 in the 
final sample.  
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Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is policy comprehensiveness, a key feature of policy 
reinvention. Previous studies used issue-specific measures of policy comprehensiveness 
that are not generalizable (Glick and Hays, 1991; Kim and Jennings, 2012). This study 
uses a generalizable approach; a policy becomes more comprehensive when it 
encompasses more distinct components under the core policy goal. Nonetheless, there 
might be ambiguities in the differences between an independent policy and a policy 
component of that policy. The distinction to be made is the existence of a common policy 
goal for all policy components. To achieve the common policy goal, different policy 
components expand the occasions where the policy may apply. Thus, the 
comprehensiveness of policy reinvention can be measured by a score from coding the 
number of distinct policy components.  
The variable policy comprehensiveness is constructed in the following way. 
Because the unit of analysis is dyad-year, or pairs of states by year, this variable is 
constructed by comparing any state A and state B. For each of the eight policy 
components, if state A adopts one in year t that has been adopted by state B in year t-1, it 
is coded 1, otherwise 0. As in Nicholson-Crotty and Carley (2016), a one-year lag 
accounts for the time for state A to collect and act on information on policies adopted by 
state B. Next, policy comprehensiveness is created by adding up the eight dummy 
variables; thus there are nine possible values from 0 to 8. This variable measures how 
many policy components one state adopts which were previously adopted in other states. 
The bigger the value of policy comprehensiveness, i.e. the more policy elements a state 
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has adopted, the more stringent the DUI policy that the state adopts in the direction of 
emulating those states which have already adopted them.  
Key Independent Variables 
The independent variable of interest is policy success. Many previous studies 
measure policy success by focusing on intended policy goals (Volden, 2006; Gilardi, 
Füglister, and Luyet, 2009; Shipan and Volden, 2014). For example, Volden (2006) 
constructed a dummy variable of policy success from the uninsured rate of poor children 
in the Children’s Health Insurance Program. In the same spirit, the success of DUI 
policies in this study can be measured by alcohol-related fatalities in driving accidents. 
Presumably, one of the core policy goals of DUI laws is to improve traffic safety by 
reducing the occurrence of and damage from alcohol-related fatal accidents. Thus, a state 
DUI policy succeeds in achieving its goal if alcohol-related fatalities decrease in a year.  
To measure policy success, I use two indicators of alcohol-related fatalities in this 
study. The first is the total fatality rate, i.e., the percentage of alcohol-related deaths 
among total deaths in driving accidents. The data are released by the Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System of National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA). 
Per NHTSA, a fatal crash is defined “as alcohol-related or alcohol-involved if at least one 
driver or non-occupant (such as a pedestrian or pedal cyclist) involved in the crash is 
determined to have had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .01 gram per deciliter 
(g/dL) or higher. Thus, any fatality that occurs in an alcohol-related crash is considered 
an alcohol-related fatality” (NHTSA, website). Note that legal intoxication is not required 
(usually .08). The second is the driver fatality rate, which is the number of alcohol-
related deaths of drivers in driving accidents per one thousand people. The data for the 
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driver fatality rate come from the same source and share the same definition as that of the 
total fatality rate.  
For both indicators of policy success, a one-year lag is taken to mimic the time 
needed for such data to be available for policy making3. If policy success has a positive 
effect on policy comprehensiveness as hypothesized, these two indicators should have 
negative signs because more fatalities signify less policy success. To facilitate 
interpretation, the indicators are recoded by multiplying by -1. They both should have 
positive signs if the Policy Learning Hypothesis holds because larger values of the 
reverse coded fatality rates mean lower fatalities, more success, and hence higher levels 
of policy comprehensiveness.   
To examine the effects of lobbying on policy reinvention, a measure of lobbying 
by the interest group, MADD, is in place. The variable MADD is measured as number of 
MADD chapters per 1 million drivers4 (Eisenberg, 2003). The data come from original 
collection by Eisenberg (2003) for years between 1982 and 2000. A larger number of 
MADD local chapters indicates a stronger presence in a state, and thus, potentially 
stronger lobbying efforts. For example, MADD may make more political contributions or 
provide more policy-relevant information to legislators in states where it has more local 
chapters. This measure of MADD lobbying is imperfect; it fails to capture the variation 
of numbers and time commitments of local chapter members (Eisenberg, 2003). However, 
                                                
3 The NHTSA data used to measure policy success for the last year are made 
available in this year. This suggests that a one-year lag is appropriate. An alternative 
specification is to lag all independent variables for one year, as in Carley, Nicholson-
Crotty, and Miller (2016). The results are robust when adopting this approach.  
4 An alternative way is to scale the number of MADD chapters by population. The 
correlation between the size of population and the number of drivers by state and by year 
is about 0.99 in the sample. Thus, this is unlikely to change the results.   
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there are no longitudinal data to track lobbying activities of MADD over two decades and 
the number of chapters should be correlated with lobbying activity. As an imperfect 
measure, the variable MADD may underestimate the impacts of MADD’s lobbying on 
states’ adoption of DUI policies.  
The variable MADD should have a positive effect on policy comprehensiveness if 
MADD succeeds in lobbying for more stringent DUI policies as argued in previous 
studies (Fell and Voas, 2006). To test the Lobbying and Policy Learning Hypotheses, 
interaction terms between MADD and the two indicators of policy success are included. If 
lobbying increases the effect of policy learning on policy comprehensiveness, the 
interaction terms should have positive signs. If lobbying decreases the effect of policy 
learning, the interaction terms should have negative signs.  
Control Variables 
The control variables include political, policy-specific, economic, and 
demographic factors. The political variables controlled are as follows. Citizen liberalism: 
This is an indicator constructed for the active electorate in each state, ranging from 0 to 
100 on a conservative-liberal continuum (Berry et al., 1998). To facilitate interpretation 
of coefficients, it is rescaled to from 0 to 1. Given the morality elements of alcohol use 
and drunk driving, conservatives usually take tougher policy attitudes against it than 
liberals do (Reinarman, 1988). Hence, conservative ideology is expected to lead to more 
comprehensive adoption of these regulatory policies.  
Partisan control: This is a variable to measure the effects of state partisan politics 
on DUI policies, drawn from Klarner 
(http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm). It equals -1 when there is unified 
23 
 
Republican control of state legislatures and governor’s office, equals +1 when there is 
unified Democratic control, and equals 0 otherwise. Compared to divided government, 
unified party control should make it easier for a party either to adopt or reject a DUI 
regulation. Based on their ideological positions, Democratic Party control may lead to 
less comprehensive adoption of DUI policies than Republican Party control. Legislative 
professionalism: This is measured as Squire Index (Squire, 2007). A more professional 
legislature is in a better position to generate policy relevant knowledge for innovation on 
its own and has weaker incentives to learn from others. On the other hand, higher levels 
of legislative professionalism indicate stronger ability for a state legislature to learn from 
others (Shipan and Volden, 2014), which may lead to more comprehensive adoption of 
DUI policies.  
The policy-specific control variables are as follows. Total fatality rate and driver 
fatality rate: These two indicators of policy outcomes are controlled to measure the 
effects of DUI policies in prior years in state A. Consistent with other control variables 
for state A, they are not lagged. If more success of previous policies encourages state A 
to adopt more comprehensive policies as in a “positive feedback”, these two variables 
should have positive effects on policy comprehensiveness. On the other hand, less success 
of previous policies signify severer policy problems and thus may motivate more 
comprehensive policy adoption. If so, these two variables should have negative effects. 
Ln of highway mileage: This is the miles of highway in a state in natural log form. States 
with longer highways are more likely to care about and regulate driving safety issues 
such as drunk driving, and thus adopt more comprehensive DUI laws.  Ln of miles of 
travel per capita: This is the total annual vehicle miles of travel per state, standardized by 
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state population. Longer distance of travel should increase demand for drunk driving 
regulations and comprehensiveness of DUI laws.  
Alcohol tax per capita: This is the alcohol tax collected in real value, standardized 
by state population. States collecting more alcohol taxes may regulate drunk driving more 
stringently as higher taxes imply negative attitudes of policymakers and the public toward 
drunk driving. On the other hand, heavier alcohol taxes may discourage drunk driving 
and thus decrease the demand for such regulations. Therefore, the sign of the effect of 
this variable is unclear. Alcohol consumption per capita: This is annual alcohol 
consumption measured in gallons of ethanol, standardized by state population. More 
alcohol consumption means more potential drunk driving accidents and thus higher 
demand for drunk driving regulations.  
The economic and demographic variables controlled in the model are as follows. 
GDP per capita: This is gross domestic product of all industries in a state, standardized 
by state population and measured in millions of dollars. As found by Walker (1969), 
wealthier states are more likely to innovate and less likely to learn from others. On the 
other hand, they are more likely to be emulated by other states. Therefore, in addition to 
the GDP per capita of adopting states, GDP per capita in the states being emulated is 
included to measure the characters of leader states.  
Evangelical Protestant: This is the estimated proportion of state population that is 
evangelical Protestant by state by year. Gracey (2015) generated this estimate using the 
Multilevel Regression with Poststratification (MRP) method based on pooled, individual-
level religiosity data of about 200 survey-years. The National Association of Evangelicals 
was very active in advocating for more severe punishments for drunk driving in the 1980s 
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(Reinarman, 1988). Hence, this variable is expected to be positively correlated with 
policy comprehensiveness of state DUI regulations. Nonetheless, the data 5  for the 
variable Evangelical Protestant are only available between 1987 and 2000. As a 
robustness check, the model is estimated with and without control for this variable.  
To measure the similarities between state A and state B, absolute differences are 
taken for two variables. Ideological difference: This is the absolute difference between 
the scores of government ideologies of state A and state B. Government ideology is 
measured by a score ranging from 0 to 100 that shows average ideological tendency of 
state elected officials along a conservative-liberal continuum (Berry et al., 2010). The 
score is rescaled to from 0 to 1 to facilitate interpretation of results. Previous studies 
found ideological distance between two states reduces the likelihood of policy learning 
(Butler et al., 2015). Thus, the variable ideological difference should have a negative 
effect on policy comprehensiveness. Difference of population size: This is the absolute 
difference between total populations of state A and state B, measured in millions. Walker 
(1969) found that states with larger population sizes are more likely to become leader 
states that are emulated by smaller states. This indicates that differences of population 
sizes between two states should be positively correlated with policy learning. On the 
other hand, similarities in population sizes of two states imply similarities in policy 
problems and potentially applicable solutions, which may promote policy learning 
between them. Thus, the sign of the effect of this variable is unclear. Table 2.2 shows the 
summary statistics for all the variables.  
 
                                                
5 Moreover, the data for this variable are missing for years 1990, 1991, 1994, and 
1995. 
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Table 2. 2 Summary Statistics  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean S.D. min max 
      
Policy comprehensiveness 33,674 0.131 0.376 0 4 
Total fatality rate 33,674 0.318 0.072 0.120 0.550 
Driver fatality rate 33,674 0.040 0.018 0.002 0.112 
MADD 33,674 4.750 4.479 0 21 
Evangelical Protestant 18,393 0.278 0.144 0.041 0.777 
Citizen liberalism 33,674 48.56 14.94 9.250 93.91 
Legislative professionalism 33,674 0.210 0.133 0.034 0.659 
Partisan control 32,948 0.126 0.643 -1 1 
Alcohol tax per capita 33,674 18.96 12.64 0 150.6 
Alcohol consumption per capita 33,674 1.914 0.433 0.910 4.220 
Ln of highway mileage 33,674 17.86 0.917 15.20 19.54 
Ln of miles of travel per capita 33,674 9.107 0.183 8.469 9.722 
State GDP per capita 33,674 0.034 0.015 0.01 0.091 
Ideological difference 33,674 13.21 9.712 0 49.79 
Difference of population size 33,674 5.073 5.760 0 33.26 
Year 33,674   1983 2000 
      
 
Results of the Estimation 
Table 2.3 shows the effects of policy success and lobbying by MADD on policy 
comprehensiveness. In columns (1) and (2), policy success is measured by total fatality 
rate. In columns (3) and (4), policy success is measured by driver fatality rate. The 
variable Evangelical Protestant is controlled in columns (1) and (3) but omitted in 
columns (2) and (4).  
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Table 2. 3 Lobbying, Policy Success, and Policy Comprehensiveness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 
Learning: Policy Success in State B     
Total fatality rate 0.418*** 
(0.080) 
0.263*** 
(0.096) 
  
Driver fatality rate   0.398* 0.668** 
   (0.236) (0.328) 
Lobbying     
MADD -0.006** -0.012*** -0.001 -0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lobbying and Learning     
Total fatality rate× MADD -0.026*** -0.041***   
 (0.009) (0.009)   
Driver fatality rate× MADD   -0.054 -0.110*** 
 
Internal Factors of State A 
  (0.038) (0.041) 
Evangelical Protestant  0.052  0.072* 
  (0.037)  (0.039) 
Citizen liberalism -0.031 -0.170*** -0.022 -0.172*** 
 (0.047) (0.059) (0.047) (0.060) 
Partisan control 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.010* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Legislative professionalism -0.162*** -0.425*** -0.163*** -0.429*** 
 (0.044) (0.057) (0.044) (0.056) 
Total fatality rate 0.529*** 1.094***   
 (0.057) (0.098)   
Driver fatality rate   0.736*** 1.319*** 
   (0.235) (0.374) 
Ln of highway mileage -0.201*** -0.416*** -0.196*** -0.393*** 
 (0.041) (0.057) (0.042) (0.058) 
Ln of miles of travel per capita 0.219*** 0.337*** 0.249*** 0.362*** 
 (0.036) (0.047) (0.036) (0.047) 
Alcohol consumption per capita 0.006 0.131*** 0.011 0.166*** 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.024) (0.029) 
Alcohol tax per capita 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita -1.166** 2.157** -0.998* 1.410 
 (0.593) (0.918) (0.597) (0.933) 
Relationship between States A and B     
Ideological difference -0.042 -0.027 -0.036 -0.022 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.031) 
Difference of population size 0.013*** 0.008* 0.013*** 0.009** 
 
State B as leaders 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
GDP per capita 0.472 0.014 0.739 -0.004 
 (0.735) (0.837) (0.738) (0.857) 
Constant 2.215*** 4.664*** 1.519* 3.587*** 
 (0.822) (1.084) (0.850) (1.100) 
Dyad fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,948 17,986 32,948 17,986 
R-squared 0.065 0.053 0.063 0.044 
Number of dyads 2,342 2,235 2,342 2,235 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by dyads of states 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The interpretation of two constitutive variables is complicated by the inclusion of 
their interaction term. As Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006: 71) point out, one should 
not “interpret constitutive terms as unconditional marginal effects”. Based on the results 
in column (1) of Table 2.3, the marginal effect of total fatality rate conditional on MADD 
is 0.418-0.026*MADD. Similarly, the marginal effect of MADD conditional on total 
fatality rate is -0.006-0.026*total fatality rate. The coefficient of total fatality rate, 0.418, 
shows the marginal effect of this variable only when MADD equals 0. Since the variable 
MADD ranges from 0 to 21 in the sample, this is an extreme case. By the same logic, the 
coefficient of MADD, -0.006, shows the marginal effect of MADD only when total 
fatality rate is 0. In the sample, total fatality rate ranges from -0.55 to -0.12, and thus 0 is 
out of the sample range.  
To interpret the marginal effect of total fatality rate or MADD, one must fix the 
other constitutive term at certain levels. For example, when fixing the value of MADD at 
its sample mean of about 4.78, the marginal effect of total fatality rate is about 0.29 and 
statistically significant at p=0.01. In other words, for a state with an average number of 
MADD chapters per one million drivers, the marginal effect of the variable total fatality 
rate is about 0.29. This indicates that if the alcohol-related fatality rate in state B 
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decreases by 10 percentage points, state A adopts about 0.028 more DUI regulations. 
Since the standard deviation of policy comprehensiveness is about 0.38, this change 
amounts to about 7 percent of one standard deviation.  
Figure 2.1 shows the marginal effect of policy success as measured by total 
fatality rate on policy comprehensiveness at various levels of MADD with 95% 
confidence intervals. The marginal effect of total fatality rate statistically differs from 
zero (p=0.05) when the number of MADD chapters per one million drivers is smaller 
than about 10. Within this range, the marginal effect of total fatality rate is positive and 
decreases as MADD increases. When MADD increases beyond 10, the marginal effect of 
total fatality rate continues to decrease but does not reach statistical significance (p=0.05). 
This suggests that total fatality rate has a positive effect on policy comprehensiveness 
when the number of MADD chapters per one million drivers is relatively low. This is 
consistent with the Policy Learning Hypothesis. Moreover, as MADD increases, the 
marginal effect of total fatality rate decreases. This is consistent with the Lobbying and 
Policy Learning Hypothesis B in that lobbying decreases the effects of policy learning on 
policy reinvention.  
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Figure 2. 1 Marginal Effects of Policy Success (Total Fatality Rate) Conditional on 
Lobbying (MADD Chapters) 
 
 
To interpret the marginal effect of MADD on policy comprehensiveness, one may 
fix the value of total fatality rate at its sample mean. In the sample, the average level of 
total fatality rate is about -0.32. The marginal effect of MADD is about 0.002 but not 
statistically significant at p=0.1 level. This indicates that lobbying by MADD is 
ineffective in advocating for more comprehensive DUI laws when there is an average 
level of policy success in other states. Figure 2.2 shows the marginal effect of MADD at 
various levels of total fatality rate with 95% confidence intervals. When total fatality rate 
is between -0.55 and -0.4, the marginal effect of MADD is positive and statistically 
differs from zero at p=0.05. Note that a larger value of the reversely coded total fatality 
rate indicates more successful policies. Thus, this indicates that MADD is effective in 
lobbying for stricter DUI laws when policies in other states are less successful. This is 
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consistent with the Lobbying Hypothesis in that lobbying increases policy 
comprehensiveness. Furthermore, the marginal effect of MADD on policy 
comprehensiveness decreases when the reversely coded total fatality rate increases or 
when policies in state B become more successful. As total fatality rate increases beyond -
0.4, or policies become more successful, the marginal effect of MADD continues to 
decrease and becomes statistically insignificant at p=0.05. This is consistent with the 
Lobbying and Policy Learning Hypothesis B in that policy success decreases the effect of 
lobbying on policy reinvention.  
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Figure 2. 2 Marginal Effects of Lobbying (MADD Chapters) Conditional on Policy 
Success (Total Fatality Rate) 
 
 
When controlling for the variable Evangelical Protestant in column (2), both total 
fatality rate and its interaction with MADD remain the same in sign and statistical 
significance (p=0.01). This indicates that the results of policy learning and its interaction 
effects with lobbying are robust with additional control of religious preferences of state 
population over DUI policies. Columns (3) and (4) show an additional robustness check 
with an alternative measure of policy success, driver fatality rate. As shown in column 
(3), the variable driver fatality rate has a positive and statistically significant effect 
(p=0.1) on policy comprehensiveness, while its interaction with MADD has a negative but 
statistically insignificant effect. When controlling for Evangelical Protestant in column 
(4), both effects remain the same in signs, increase in sizes, and become statistically 
significant at p=0.01 level. Therefore, the results in columns (1) and (2) are robust with 
33 
 
alternative measures of policy success. Results are stronger with religion measured in the 
model.  
The effects of control variables remain largely consistent across models. First, the 
variable Evangelical Protestant, as shown in column (4), has a positive effect (p=0.1) as 
expected. Second, the three variables measuring political features of state A have 
statistically significant effects on policy comprehensiveness. Citizen liberalism reaches 
statistical significance (p=0.01) when controlling for Evangelical Protestant. This 
indicates that, as expected, liberal citizen ideology is associated with less comprehensive 
adoption of DUI laws, controlling for religion and other factors. Partisan control has a 
positive and statistically significant effect (p=0.05) in each model. This implies that 
Democratic unified control of government is correlated with more comprehensive 
adoption of DUI laws. The divergence between these two effects indicates that 
government party control is incongruent with citizen ideological preference. Legislative 
professionalism has a negative and statistically significant effect (p=0.01) in each model. 
This indicates that more professional legislatures are correlated with less comprehensive 
policy reinvention, as found by Hays (1996b).  
Third, all policy-specific variables show statistically significant results. Both 
indicators of policy success for state A are positive and statistically significant (p=0.01) 
in each model. This suggests that successes of previous policies are positively correlated 
with comprehensive policy reinvention. This might reflect two possibilities. First, states 
learn from their own experiences of successful policies. Second, learning from own 
experiences and learning from other states complement each other. Policymakers may be 
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encouraged by successes of past policies to search more successful policies elsewhere if 
their own policies are relatively less successful compared to others’.  
The variable Ln of highway mileage shows a negative and statistically significant 
effect (p=0.01) across models. This indicates that longer highways are associated with 
less comprehensive adoption of DUI regulations. The variable miles of travel per capita 
shows a positive and statistically significant effect (p=0.01) across models. Hence, 
demand for DUI regulations increases when more people travel on the highways in a state. 
As expected, both alcohol consumption and alcohol tax show positive and statistically 
significant effects (p=0.01) on policy comprehensiveness across models, especially when 
controlling for religion. The variable GDP per capita for state A has a negative sign as 
expected in columns (1) and (3), but it turns positive in column (2) when controlling for 
religion.  
Fourth, for the two variables measuring relationship between state A and state B, 
only Difference of population size shows statistically significant effect on policy 
comprehensiveness. The positive sign of this variable indicates that states of similar sizes 
are less likely to learn from each other. This may result from states with less population 
learning from more populous states like New York or California (Walker, 1969).   
Conclusion and Discussion 
In this study, the focus of policy diffusion shifts to policy reinvention, 
operationalized as policy comprehensiveness. Policy learning as a mechanism of policy 
diffusion applies similarly, if not better, to policy reinvention. In addition, the interaction 
between lobbying and policy learning is investigated both theoretically and empirically. 
Lobbying by interest groups can change incentives and content of learning by 
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policymakers. Policy learning by policymakers themselves would become less necessary 
if interest groups succeed in swinging policies to their favor by making political 
contributions or providing information. Moreover, policy-relevant information from 
lobbying represents an alternative for information search by policymakers themselves. 
These interactions may increase or decrease learning about policy success information.   
The empirical tests support the proposition that learning from states with 
successful policies makes it more likely for states to adopt more comprehensive policies. 
Specifically, with indicators of outcomes showing that DUI laws in other states succeed 
in achieving intended policy goals, states tend to adopt more of those laws when lobbying 
by MADD is low. Focusing on a new policy issue from a different theoretical perspective, 
this extends previous findings that policy success increases policy diffusion (Volden, 
2006; Gilardi and Füglister, 2008; Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet, 2009; Shipan and Volden, 
2014; Butler et al., 2015; Nicholson-Crotty and Carley, 2016). In addition to ability to 
learn (Shipan and Volden, 2014; Nicholson-Crotty and Carley, 2016), policy learning is 
conditional on influence of interest groups.  
With MADD as an interest group in state DUI policies, the empirical results 
indicate that lobbying increases policy comprehensiveness when policy success is 
relatively low. This indicates that MADD succeeds in lobbying for more stringent DUI 
regulation, consistent with the public image of MADD as a significant force shaping state 
DUI laws. Moreover, this suggests that lobbying by MADD is conditional on policy 
learning by policymakers themselves. Lobbying is more likely to succeed when 
policymakers are less likely to rely on policy success elsewhere because previous policy 
innovations are not that successful. The conditional effect of policy learning on lobbying 
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in policy reinvention extends the previous finding that interest groups can increase policy 
diffusion (Balla, 2001; Haider-Markel, 2001; Garrett and Jansa, 2015).  
The finding that lobbying substitutes for policy learning about policy success can 
be explored further. While this study shows the substitution effect, more research is 
needed to disentangle the mechanisms through which lobbying influences policy learning. 
Furthermore, this finding can be extended to cases where it is feasible to study lobbying 
by multiple interest groups on both sides of a policy issue. More broadly, future research 
can test the conditional effects of lobbying in other contexts and examine the varied 
conditions under which success makes a difference.  
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Chapter 3 Does Financial Disclosure Matter? GASB 45 and Municipal 
Borrowing Costs 
Introduction 
Public administration scholars have widely recognized the importance of 
transparency in improving government accountability (Heald, 2003; Piotrowski and Van 
Ryzin, 2007; Etzioni, 2014; Ferry and Eckersley, 2014). As a significant facet of 
transparency, fiscal transparency refers to “openness toward the public at large about 
government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and 
projections” (Kopits and Craig, 1998). Fiscal transparency allows citizens to know how 
public money is raised and spent and to hold government accountable. Lack of fiscal 
transparency, on the other hand, catalyzes failures of government accountability, as 
evidenced by the case of public finance crisis in Jefferson County, Alabama (Howell-
Moroney and Hall, 2011).  
One critical part of fiscal transparency is debt transparency. Some types of 
government debts, such as general obligation bonds, are more transparent than others 
(Duncombe, Robbins, and Simonsen, 2012). A main form of the less transparent 
government debts is the underfunded long-term obligations for other postemployment 
benefit (OPEB) plans. OPEB includes retiree health care, life insurance, disability 
payments, and long-term care. State and local governments have long funded their OPEB 
plans through pay-as-you-go financing and reported no long-term financial obligations. 
This makes the true budgetary costs of government OPEB promises less transparent to 
the public. For the public to hold government accountable on their OPEB spending, 
greater fiscal transparency is indispensable.  
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Government financial disclosure is the key step to achieve fiscal transparency. 
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is the party that regulates 
accounting and financial reporting for U.S. state and local governments. In 2004, the 
GASB issued Statement No. 45 to require state and local governments to disclose 
information on their OPEB plans. GASB 45 was implemented for local governments of 
different sizes in a three-year transition period beginning in 2006. In 2015, GASB 45 was 
replaced by GASB Statement No. 75, which sets more comprehensive and stricter 
accounting and financial reporting standards for OPEB plans. GASB 45, however, was 
the first disclosure requirement for local government OPEB plans. Understanding the 
consequences of GASB 45 can inform decision-makers about the potential impacts of 
GASB 75 and government financial disclosure in general.  
This study examines the impact of GASB 45 on local government borrowing 
costs. This is an important research topic. First, stakeholders in the municipal bond 
market are among the key users of government financial information. The potential link 
from disclosure to transparency and accountability is more likely to be realized if 
information disclosed is used by relevant decision-makers. Second, for local governments, 
this study enhances understanding of benefits and costs of complying with financial 
disclosure standards. Given that many local governments borrow extensively in the bond 
market, changes in borrowing costs can have substantial impacts on their budgets. Third, 
information disclosure is vital for municipal bond pricing. Whether the municipal bond 
market responds to OPEB information is a test of its efficiency.  
As a preview, the results show that GASB 45 has a nontrivial impact on 
borrowing costs of county governments. Specifically, GASB 45 increases borrowing 
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costs, with the effects decreasing over time and disappearing after the first two years of 
implementation. This paper makes four contributions. First, it adds to the literature by 
examining the effects of GASB 45 on a different outcome variable, government 
borrowing costs, instead of credit ratings. Second, this paper proposes a theoretical 
framework incorporating both direct and indirect effects of financial disclosure on 
government borrowing costs. Third, this paper tests empirical implications of the 
framework while addressing endogeneity concerns. Fourth, this paper uses large data sets 
of bonds issued by counties. Big national samples of counties enable greater statistical 
power and external validity than small sample sizes and within-state analysis.  
GASB 45 and Previous Research 
A typical compensation package for local government employees consists of 
salaries, pensions, and other postemployment benefits (OPEB). While pensions are 
usually prefunded, OPEB is financed from general funds on a pay-as-you-go basis. An 
OPEB expense is recognized when benefits are paid to employees but not when costs are 
incurred. Thus, local governments do not report long-term OPEB liabilities in their 
financial reports. Without financial reporting, local governments may have accumulated 
large OPEB debts that are hidden from the public. This lack of transparency may cause 
future fiscal pressure on government budgets and default risks from the perspective of 
municipal bond investors.   
In 2004, GASB released statement No. 45 to regulate financial disclosure by local 
governments on their OPEB plans. The objective of GASB 45 is to establish “standards 
for the measurement, recognition, and display of OPEB expense/expenditures and related 
liabilities (assets), note disclosures, and, if applicable, required supplementary 
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information in the financial reports of state and local governmental employers” (GASB 
45, 2004). GASB 45 was implemented in three phases for local governments in 2006, 
2007, and 2008, respectively. GASB 45 requests local governments to use accrual 
accounting rules for OPEB plans. Accrual accounting recognizes costs when they are 
incurred, regardless of when cash transfer occurs. This improves the accuracy of financial 
reporting on OPEB plans relative to the previous pay-as-you-go accounting. For the first 
time, local governments reported assets, liabilities, annual costs, and annual contributions 
for their OPEB plans in the comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs). This 
represents new information on the financial status and funding progress of OPEB plans. 
As one of the main users of local government CAFRs, this financial information enables 
the municipal bond market to better understand default risks of bonds issued by local 
governments.  
Scholars have discussed challenges for state and local governments to implement 
GASB 45. First, small local governments may face prohibitive costs of implementation 
because of limited resources (Voorhees, 2005). Second, governments cutting OPEB may 
see their quality of employees decline. Coe and Rivenbark (2010) argue that local 
governments should not reduce OPEB to the extent that may make it difficult for them to 
recruit and to retain employees. Coggburn and Kearney (2010) draw attention to the 
tension between cutting OPEB levels and maintaining a professional workforce for state 
governments. Though both arguments are compelling, empirical evidence is needed to 
show the impacts of OPEB cuts on public employee quality.  
In addition, existing studies have focused on responses of state and local 
governments to GASB 45 (Wisniewski, 2005). For example, Coggburn, Daley, and 
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Kearney (2012) surveyed states’ plans to address OPEB liabilities disclosed under GASB 
45. They find that few states plan to take such unpopular policy actions as raising taxes to 
prefund OPEB liabilities. Matkin and Krivosheyev (2012) find that Florida cities and 
counties respond to GASB 45 by reducing OPEB for future employees. Yusuf and 
Musumeci (2012) proposed a typology to analyze local governments’ responses to GASB 
45 by whether they choose pay-as-you go financing or prefunding OPEB and whether 
they maintain or cut OPEB. Under this typology, existing studies suggest that most state 
and local governments choose pay-as-you-go financing and OPEB cuts.  
Thus, many studies have discussed implementation of and responses to GASB 45 
by local governments, but few of them examine empirically consequences of 
implementing GASB 45. Exceptions are Marlowe (2007) and Matkin and Krivosheyev 
(2012), which focus on the impacts of OPEB liabilities and government responses under 
GASB 45 on borrowing costs and credit ratings of local governments. Moreover, this 
present study examines the impact of the requirement of GASB 45, instead of the 
compliance with it, on government borrowing costs. Because GASB has no way to 
mandate compliance with its statements, “intended” policy effects are more practically 
relevant than policy effects on the compliers only.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
GASB 45, Financial Condition, and Borrowing Costs 
GASB 45 represents a substantial increase of financial disclosure of OPEB plans. 
Before GASB 45, bond investors might obtain information about OPEB from several 
sources. First, GASB statement No. 26 covered financial reporting of retiree healthcare 
benefits, which is a major part of OPEB. Second, rating agencies might have private 
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information about OPEB of bond issuers and reflect such information in rating changes. 
Third, implemented one year before GASB 45, GASB 43 requires information disclosure 
at the level of OPEB plans, which can be traced back to individual governments that own 
such plans. While these sources of information allow bond investors to have certain 
estimates of OPEB financial condition, none of them provides OPEB information like 
that under GASB 45. After GASB 45, local governments started to report OPEB 
information in a direct, comprehensive way.  
The impacts of disclosure change under GASB 45 on municipal borrowing costs 
can be analyzed in the following theoretical framework developed by Poterba and 
Rueben (1999).  Poterba and Rueben (1999: 183) assume that “the market for tax-exempt 
bonds clears by equating the after-tax return that a ‘marginal investor’ can earn on tax-
exempt bonds with the after-tax, risk-adjusted return that is available on a riskless taxable 
bond”. They also assume that the taxable bond is not a Treasury bond and the tax-exempt 
bonds are held only by residents within a state. Suppose RT represents the yield from a 
taxable bond and RE denotes the yield from a tax-exempt bond issued by a local 
government, then RE equals to the after-tax taxable yield RT plus a risk premium in the 
equilibrium.   
(1)                               RE =[1-τf –τs] RT +σ(Z(D), D, X)  
In equation (1), τf  denotes the marginal federal income tax rate on interest income 
of bond investors, and τs denotes the marginal state income tax rate on interest income of 
investors in the state where the local government locates. The risk premium σ depends on 
three vectors of factors. Z represents the financial condition of OPEB plans of the local 
government, while D represents financial disclosure of OPEB information. In addition, X 
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denotes other factors that determine the risk premium. X can include factors at both the 
government level and the bond level. For example, X may include fiscal, economic, or 
demographic characteristics of the local government as well as characteristics of bonds 
issued by that government.   
Of special interest are the factors Z and D that influence the risk premium σ. Z 
represents the financial condition of an OPEB plan that is observed by bond investors. 
For example, Z can include such financial indicators as annual employer contribution as a 
percentage of annual cost, funded ratios, or unfunded liabilities of OPEB plans. As Z 
increases or the observed financial condition of OPEB plans improves, the risk premium 
required by investors should decrease because of lower potential default risks. Everything 
else equal, a lower risk premium corresponds to a lower level of bond yield in the 
equilibrium, as shown in equation (2).  
(2)                                          d RE/d Z=d σ/ d Z <0 
Financial disclosure, D, influences the information about OPEB plans that is 
available to bond investors. As shown in equation (1), the OPEB financial condition 
observed by investors, Z, is a function of financial disclosure, D. As financial disclosure 
of OPEB plans increases, the financial condition of OPEB plans becomes more 
transparent to bond investors. More transparency of OPEB plans may increase, decrease, 
or not change the observed OPEB financial condition by bond investors. First, as more 
information becomes available after financial disclosure, bond investors may observe 
improved financial condition of OPEB plans. Second, after more financial disclosure, 
they may observe deteriorated financial condition of OPEB plans. Third, the observed 
OPEB financial condition by bond investors may remain the same regardless of more 
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financial disclosure. This may occur if bond investors have already had the newly 
disclosed information from other sources. The relationship between financial disclosure 
of OPEB plans and observed OPEB financial condition by investors can be summarized 
as follows.  
(3)                                 Case 1  d Z/d D>0 (improved) 
                                Case 2  d Z/d D<0 (deteriorated) 
                                Case 3  d Z/d D=0 (unchanged) 
In addition, financial disclosure of OPEB information may influence the risk 
premium independent of its impact on observed OPEB financial condition. While the 
content of disclosed information helps bond investors evaluate the financial condition of 
OPEB plans, the disclosure itself may reduce the uncertainty faced by bond investors in 
assessing bond default risks. Previous studies have shown that such disclosure regulations 
as GAAP reduce default risks and decrease municipal borrowing cost (Benson, Marks, 
and Raman, 1984; Benson, Marks, and Raman, 1991; Baber and Gore, 2008; Fairchild 
and Koch, 1998). This suggests that disclosure can reduce default risks regardless of the 
content of information being disclosed.  
The municipal bond market features information asymmetry between bond issuers 
and bond investors (Denison, 2001). Bond investors typically have less information about 
financial positions of bond issuers, especially when bond issuers are small local 
governments or issue bonds infrequently and thus are less known to the bond market 
(Roden and Bland, 1986). When disclosure of OPEB information is absent or insufficient, 
bond investors require a higher risk premium to compensate for the uncertainty resulting 
from information asymmetry. Increased OPEB disclosure under GASB 45 reduces the 
45 
 
information asymmetry and thus the uncertainty that warrants an otherwise higher risk 
premium. Therefore, the risk premium decreases because of more disclosure of OPEB 
plans.  
(4)                                            d σ / d D <0 
The total effects of financial disclosure of OPEB plans on the tax-exempt bond 
yield are as follows. 
(5)                               d RE/ d D=d σ/ d Z × d Z/d D + d σ / d D 
In other words, OPEB financial disclosure has both direct and indirect effects on 
bond yields. The direct effect results from decreased information asymmetry between 
bond issuers and bond investors. The indirect effect results from the reassessments of 
OPEB financial condition. Based on equations (2) (3) and (4), the sign of the total effect 
of financial disclosure on bond yield depends on how it influences observed OPEB 
financial condition.  
(6)                           Case 1  d Z/d D>0, d RE/ d D<0 
                                Case 2a  d Z/d D<0, |dσ/dD| > |dσ/dZ × dZ/dD|, d RE/ d D<0 
                                Case 2b  d Z/d D<0, |dσ/dD| = |dσ/dZ × dZ/dD|, d RE/ d D=0 
                                Case 2c  d Z/d D<0, |dσ/dD| < |dσ/dZ × dZ/dD|, d RE/ d D>0 
                                Case 3  d Z/d D=0, d RE/ d D<0 
Thus, OPEB financial disclosure will decrease bond yields in the first and third 
cases. When financial disclosure reveals an improved financial condition of OPEB plans, 
or does not change the financial condition of OPEB plans observed by bond investors, the 
bond yield becomes lower. In contrast, OPEB financial disclosure has an indeterminate 
effect on bond yield when it reveals a worse financial condition of OPEB plans.  
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In this case, the sign of the total effect depends on the relative size of direct and 
indirect effects of financial disclosure. While the direct effect is negative, the indirect 
effect is positive. Specifically, there can be three possibilities. First, the total effect will 
be positive if the indirect effect is positive and larger in absolute value than the direct 
effect. This occurs when financial disclosure of OPEB plans reveals new information that 
leads bond investors to observe a much worse financial condition than without the 
disclosure. Second, when the observed OPEB financial condition becomes moderately 
worse under disclosure, the total effect can become zero as the direct and indirect effects 
offset each other. Third, when the observed OPEB financial condition becomes slightly 
worse after disclosure than before, the total effect becomes negative as the direct effect is 
likely to outweigh the indirect effect. The signs of total effects are summarized in Table 
3.1.  
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Table 3. 1 Disclosure, Financial Condition, and Bond Yield 
Disclosure and Financial Condition 
(d Z/d D) 
Direct 
Effect 
(d σ / d D) 
Indirect Effect 
(d σ/ d Z × d Z/d 
D) 
Total Effect  
(d RE/ d D) 
Case 1: d Z/d D>0, disclosure 
reveals an improved financial 
condition of OPEB plans 
<0 <0 <0 
Case 2a: d Z/d D<0, disclosure 
reveals a much worse financial 
condition of OPEB plans 
<0 >0 >0 
Case 2b: d Z/d D<0, disclosure 
reveals a moderately worse financial 
condition of OPEB plans 
<0 >0 =0 
Case 2c: d Z/d D<0, disclosure 
reveals a slightly worse financial 
condition of OPEB plans  
<0 >0 <0 
Case 3: d Z/d D=0, disclosure does 
not change observed OPEB financial 
condition  
<0 =0 <0 
 
Therefore, the first hypothesis follows. 
H1 GASB 45 (1) increases borrowing cost if the newly disclosed OPEB financial 
condition is much worse than before; (2) decreases borrowing costs if the newly 
disclosed financial condition is better than, the same as, or slightly worse than before; (3) 
does not change borrowing costs if the newly disclosed OPEB financial condition is 
moderately worse than before. 
Market Efficiency and Impact of GASB 45 over Time 
The market efficiency hypothesis is central to studies of the impacts of 
information on bond or stock pricing. It states that asset prices fully reflect available 
information at any time (Fama, 1970). Previous studies show that the municipal bond 
market appears semi-efficient (Denison, 2000). This means that, at any time, bond prices 
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should fully reflect all publicly available information, including information from such 
disclosure changes as GASB 45. In the primary bond market, the market efficiency 
hypothesis implies that bond prices should respond to new information available to the 
market under GASB 45. Moreover, the impacts of GASB 45 on bond prices should 
decrease over time as the bond market absorbs gradually new information about OPEB. 
The information that has been captured in the bond prices this year should have less 
impact on bond prices next year. For the same amount of new information, the bond 
market may respond to it at first and then the responses get smaller and eventually 
disappear as the information becomes no longer “new” to bond investors. The more 
efficient the bond market is, the more quickly the bond pricing responds to new 
information.  
On the other hand, the impact of GASB 45 on bond yields may increase over time 
because new information becomes available to bond investors in an incremental way 
under GASB 45. First, GASB 45 was implemented in a phase-in period of three years. 
Thus, new information about governments of different phases will come out at different 
time. Second, local governments of relatively smaller sizes may face relatively high 
implementation costs and it may take more time for them to get prepared to disclose 
OPEB information. Third, GASB 45 did not require retrospective implementation. Many 
local governments will report zero OPEB liabilities at the beginning and then positive 
liabilities later. Hence, the amount of new OPEB information available to bond investors 
is likely to increase gradually.  
Therefore, the market efficiency hypothesis predicts that the impact of GASB 45 
on local government borrowing costs will change over time. The exact pattern of 
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increasing or decreasing impact depends on the level of bond market efficiency and the 
amount of new OPEB information disclosed over time. Because more than one 
mechanism may coexist, it is difficult to predict the total pattern of changes ex ante. 
Nonetheless, if the municipal bond market is semi-efficient, it may be able to absorb the 
increasing amounts of new information over time. Thus, the second hypothesis follows.  
H2 The effects of GASB 45 on local government borrowing costs diminish over 
time. 
Empirical Strategy 
Data and Sample 
The sample used in the empirical analysis is constructed in two steps. First, data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of State and Local Government Finance are used 
to construct measures of fiscal and demographic characteristics of counties. The data 
show the annual total revenues of local governments. This is the reference variable that 
GASB 45 uses to assign local governments to the three phases of implementation. Since 
it takes three years for all the local governments of three phases to implement GASB 45, 
it would be ideal to have panel data to follow them before, during, and after the 
implementation. The census data are used to construct such a panel. Using all the 
counties repeatedly sampled by the Census Bureau each year results in a panel between 
1999 and 2012. If the sampling by the Census Bureau is unbiased, this approach should 
not bias the results in this study.  
Second, the panel of counties is matched with the bonds they issued in the 
primary market between 1999 and 2012. The bond data come from Bloomberg.  A list of 
807 counties was repeatedly sampled by the Census Bureau. Among them, 673 counties 
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are successfully matched with 91,357 bonds they issued between 1999 and 2012. The 
other 134 unmatched counties did not issue any bonds in this period. In the final sample, 
the number of counties in Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3 of GASB 45 implementation are 
312, 330, and 31, respectively. Among 91,357 bonds in the sample, Phase 1 governments 
issue 75.5%, Phase 2 governments issue 30.1%, and Phase 3 governments issue 1.6%. 
Thus, Phase 3 governments are under-represented in the sample, maybe because their size 
limits their fiscal capacity to issue bonds.  
Econometric Methods 
To model the sample selection resulting from whether counties choose to issue 
bonds in a year, a Heckman selection model is estimated. Fairchild and Koch (1998) 
point out that financial disclosure can decrease borrowing costs by screening out risky 
issuers. This implies that GASB 45 may influence municipal borrowing costs not only 
through reducing information asymmetry but also changing the decision to issue bonds. 
The dependent variable, yield, can be observed only if a county chooses to issue a bond. 
Not all counties issue bonds each year between 1999 and 2012. If GASB 45 influences 
their decision to issue bonds in the first place, then the sample of counties that have 
issued bonds is non-random.  
The Heckman selection model provides a classic solution to sample selection 
(Heckman, 1979). The Heckman selection model is estimated in two steps. The first step 
is to estimate a selection equation, which is a probit model predicting the likelihood for a 
county to issue bonds. The second step is to estimate an outcome equation, or a model 
explaining the bond yields conditional on having issued bonds in the first step. The 
Heckman selection model is identified by including some fiscal variables in the equation 
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predicting issuing bonds but not in the yield equation (see below). This model corrects 
the sample selection with Heckman lamda. The Heckman lamda indicates the correlation 
of error terms of the dependent variables in the two equations and is included in the 
outcome equation.  
While each bond is unique in the sample, the data are a panel at the county level. 
To account for unobserved, time-invariant factors, the outcome equation controls for 
fixed effects of counties with dummy variables. This is valuable because longitudinal 
data measuring local governments’ characteristics are not always available, especially for 
the small ones. Specifically, county fixed effects can account for key institutional 
characteristics6 that may influence their borrowing costs but change infrequently between 
1999 and 2012. For example, the extent to which local governments comply with GAAP 
determines whether it is mandatory or voluntary for them to comply with GASB 45. The 
more strictly they follow GAPP statements, the larger impacts GASB 45 will have on 
their borrowing costs. There are no longitudinal data, however, on GAAP status of 
counties between 1999 and 2012. If the GAAP status did not change in this period, the 
impact of GAAP status can be controlled by county fixed effects.   
Model Specification 
Modeling Borrowing Costs 
                                                
6 This may also include state tax and expenditure limits (TELs). While TELs 
are likely to influence local government borrowing costs, they do not necessarily 
correlate with GASB 45. Thus, it is not as big a concern as GAAP status. 
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A standard model of borrowing costs emerges from such studies as Capeci (1991), 
Capeci (1994), Johnson and Kriz (2005), and Marlowe (2007), among others. Consistent 
with these studies, the dependent variable is a measure of borrowing costs, while the 
control variables consist of two levels. One is characteristics of bonds; the other is 
economic, fiscal and demographic characteristics of counties that issue bonds. 
Specifically, the dependent variable is yield at issue in the primary bond market, a 
measure of borrowing costs. Previous studies have used bond yield to measure borrowing 
costs (Capeci, 1991; Capeci, 1994; Fairchild and Koch, 1998). Bond yield accounts for 
the time value of money for borrowing costs because it is calculated as an internal rate of 
return equalizing bond price with the present value of bond proceeds. In addition, in the 
first stage of the Heckman selection model, the dependent variable is bond issue, a 
dummy variable indicating whether a county issues bonds in a year.   
The key independent variable is a dummy variable, GASB 45, indicating the 
requirement of OPEB disclosure for a county in a year. GASB 45 is based on the 
guidelines of implementation under GASB Statement No. 45. Specifically, two factors 
are considered. First, the phase of implementation under GASB 45 is determined by total 
annual revenues in 1999 or 2000. If a county has a fiscal year ending date before June 15, 
1999, it is assigned to an implementation phase based on its total revenue in 2000. If the 
ending date of the fiscal year is after June 15, 1999, then the total revenue in 1999 is used 
to assign that county to a phase of implementation. Per GASB 45, all counties with total 
revenues greater than 100 million dollars are coded as Phase 1 governments, those with 
total revenues between 10 million dollars and 100 million dollars are coded as Phase 2 
governments, and those with total revenues lower than 10 million dollars are coded as 
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Phase 3 governments. The total revenues are measured in nominal dollars, without 
adjustment for inflation. If total revenues in 1999 are missing in the sample, the total 
revenues in 2000 are used7. Similarly, if total revenues in 2000 are missing, the total 
revenues in 2001 are used8. The assumption is that, in the short term, total revenues of 
counties did not fluctuate radically around the two thresholds of 10 and 100 million 
dollars.  
Second, the implementation of GASB 45 started on December 15 of 2006, 2007, 
and 2008 for Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3 governments, respectively. For governments 
of each phase, GASB 45 is coded as 1 after the implementation date and 0 otherwise. 
Thus, by construction, GASB 45 should capture the impacts of OPEB disclosure under 
GASB 45 under the assumption that all counties comply. Because not all counties comply 
with GASB Statements, this study shows an upper bound of the impacts of GASB 45.  
Moreover, years after GASB 45 is a variable showing the years since the 
implementation of GASB 45 for governments of each implementation phase. It is coded 
as 0 for all the years before GASB 45. Phase 1 governments started to implement GASB 
45 in 2006, while the sample covers the period between 1999 and 2012. Hence, the 
variable years after GASB 45 ranges from 0 to 69. It is further treated as a factor variable 
in the model. Thus, 1 means one year after GASB 45, 2 means two years after GASB 45, 
and so on. This variable is essentially an interaction term between the key policy variable 
                                                
7 This changes 2 observations. 
8 This changes 39 observations. 
9 The estimation omits seven years after GASB 45 implementation because 
the sample contains too few observations. 
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GASB 45 and time as measured in years. The objective is to capture how the impacts of 
GASB 45 vary over time to test the second hypothesis.  
One additional variable is controlled to test the heterogeneous effects of GASB 45. 
GAAP is a variable indicating the level of compliance with GAAP by a county. It is 
coded as 1 if state governments require full compliance, 2 if only partial compliance is 
required, and 3 if no compliance is required. The data for this variable come from a 
GASB survey in 2008 (GASB, 2008). To account for inflation, all the variables measured 
in dollars are adjusted by the CPI.  
Table 3.2 summarizes the list of control variables in the model of government 
borrowing costs. The first column shows the variable names, the second column provides 
variable definitions, and the third column indicates predicted signs of coefficients based 
on theories and previous literature10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Bond Buyer Index is missing for bonds issued at some dates. The Bond 
Buyer Index in the most recent week is used to replace the missing values in these 
cases. 
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Table 3. 2 Description of Variables 
Variable Name Measurement Predicted Sign 
Dependent 
Variables 
  
Yield Yield at issue  
Key Independent 
Variables 
  
GASB 45 A dummy variable indicating whether a county 
or city is required to implement GASB 45 in a 
year 
? 
Years after GASB 
45 
The number of years since the implementation of 
GASB 45 
_ 
Control Variables: 
Bond Level 
  
Ln of time to 
maturity 
The number of days from issuing date to 
maturity date in its natural log form  
+ 
Credit rating Standard and Poor’s rating of bonds, ranging 
from highest (=1) to lowest rating (=16) 
+ 
No rating A dummy variable indicating whether a bond 
has no rating 
? 
Missing rating A dummy variable indicating whether a bond 
has missing information on rating 
? 
Callable A dummy variable indicating whether the bond 
is callable 
+ 
Competitive sale A dummy variable indicating whether the bond 
is sold using competitive sale method 
_ 
Ln of par value Issue size of a bond in dollars and in its natural 
log form 
_ 
Insured A dummy variable indicating whether the bond 
is insured by a third party 
? 
Insured missing A dummy variable whether a bond has missing 
values on the variable insured 
? 
Refunding issue A dummy variable indicating whether the bond 
is a refunding issue 
_ 
General obligation A dummy variable indicating whether the bond 
is a general obligation bond 
_ 
Bank qualified A dummy variable indicating whether the federal 
tax status of a bond is bank qualified 
_ 
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
 
Bond Buyer Index Bond Buyer 20 GO Index in the week of issuing 
date of a bond 
+ 
Control Variables: 
Government Level 
  
Debt outstanding Total outstanding debts of an issuer in billion 
dollars 
+ 
Intergovernmental 
revenue 
Intergovernmental revenue of an issuer in billion 
dollars  
+ 
Own source 
revenue  
Own source general revenue of an issuer in 
billion dollars 
_ 
Unemployment rate Annual unemployment rate at county level + 
Income per capita Per capita personal income in million dollars at 
county level 
_ 
Population Population size of a county in its natural log 
form 
_ 
 
 
Modeling Decisions to Borrow 
In the first stage of the Heckman selection model, several variables are controlled 
to predict the probability for county governments to issue bonds. The model is specified 
consistent with previous studies on government borrowing (Clingermayer and Wood, 
1995; Poterba, 1995). It controls for variables that enter the outcome equation explaining 
bond yields conditional on issuing, including GASB 45, debt outstanding, income per 
capita, ln of population, and the unemployment rate. It also controls for fiscal variables 
excluded from the outcome equation. Lag of own source revenue: This is total own 
source revenues for a county, measured in billion dollars and lagged for one year. Larger 
sizes of own source revenue reduce the financial need to borrow. Lag federal fiscal 
transfer: This is total intergovernmental revenue from the federal government, measured 
in units of a billion dollars and lagged for one year. Federal fiscal transfer may substitute 
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for borrowing by local governments. State fiscal transfer: This is total intergovernmental 
revenue from state governments, measured in units of a billion dollars. In the same logic, 
state fiscal transfer should reduce local government borrowing if substitution effects 
work. Total expenditure: This is total annual expenditure for a county government, 
measured in units of a billion dollars. Larger sizes of expenditure indicate higher level of 
need to borrow, and thus may increase the likelihood of borrowing.  
Results of the Estimation 
Main Results 
Table 3.3 shows the results of estimation with the Heckman selection model. The 
objective is to model the self-selection of county governments in the decision of issuing 
bonds. The Heckman selection model is estimated with a two-step procedure, in which 
the selection equation is estimated with a probit model. Column (1) shows the results of 
the outcome equation, where the dependent variable is bond yields conditional on bond 
issuing. Column (2) shows the results of the selection equation, where the dependent 
variable is a dummy indicating whether a county government issues bonds in a year.  
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Table 3. 3 Impact of GASB 45 on County Borrowing Costs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Outcome 
equation 
Selection 
equation 
By 
Rating 
By 
GAAP 
     
GASB 45 0.192** 
(0.082) 
0.206*** 
(0.055) 
0.145* 
(0.081) 
0.239*** 
(0.085) 
One year after GASB 45 -0.098  -0.096 -0.090 
 (0.074)  (0.072) (0.076) 
Two years after GASB 45 -0.103  -0.100 -0.098 
 (0.065)  (0.063) (0.066) 
Three years after GASB 45 -0.210***  -0.206*** -0.204*** 
 (0.056)  (0.055) (0.058) 
Four years after GASB 45 -0.117**  -0.112** -0.112** 
 (0.052)  (0.051) (0.053) 
Five years after GASB 45 -0.165***  -0.160*** -0.163*** 
 (0.046)  (0.045) (0.047) 
Six years after GASB 45 -0.182***  -0.175*** -0.180*** 
 (0.042)  (0.042) (0.044) 
Credit rating 0.016*** 
(0.002) 
 0.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
GASB 45 ×credit rating 
 
  0.028*** 
(0.003) 
 
GAAP 
 
   0.239 
(0.212) 
GASB 45 ×GAAP 
 
   -0.028*** 
(0.007) 
No rating 0.107***  0.099*** 0.107*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013) (0.014) 
Missing rating 0.232***  0.251*** 0.236*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013) 
Insured -0.126***  -0.115*** -0.126*** 
 (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009) 
Missing insured -0.087***  -0.083*** -0.086*** 
 (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) 
Ln of time to maturity 0.782***  0.784*** 0.783*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Callable  0.430***  0.428*** 0.429*** 
 (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Competitive sale -0.127***  -0.126*** -0.127*** 
 (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln of par value -0.005**  -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Refunding issue -0.160***  -0.158*** -0.159*** 
 (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009) 
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
 
General obligation -0.293***  -0.286*** -0.292*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010) (0.011) 
Bank qualified -0.367***  -0.368*** -0.366*** 
 (0.009)  (0.009) (0.010) 
Bond Buyer Index 0.583***  0.584*** 0.584*** 
 (0.011)  (0.011) (0.012) 
Debt outstanding -0.003 0.071*** -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003) 
Intergovernmental revenue 0.098***  0.100*** 0.080*** 
 (0.020)  (0.020) (0.021) 
Own source revenue -0.018  -0.022* -0.015 
 (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013) 
Income per capita -0.530 4.526*** -0.153 -0.424 
 (0.648) (0.511) (0.638) (0.665) 
Ln of population -0.360*** 0.496*** -0.345*** -0.400*** 
 (0.064) (0.009) (0.063) (0.066) 
Unemployment rate  0.059*** -0.038*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Lag own source revenue  -0.150*   
  (0.091)   
Lag federal transfer  -0.790***   
  (0.258)   
State fiscal transfer  -0.145   
  (0.091)   
Total expenditure  0.130*   
  (0.079)   
Heckman’s lambda -0.732***  -0.719*** -0.752*** 
 (0.202)  (0.198) (0.207) 
Constant -2.086*** -4.896*** -2.315*** -2.321** 
 (0.802) (0.123) (0.788) (0.944) 
County fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 80,416 80,416 80,416 80,416 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As shown in column (1), Heckman’s lambda is statistically significant at p≤0.01. 
This indicates that there is sample selection. The negative estimated coefficients mean 
that issuing counties have, on average, lower yields, for unmeasured reasons. As column 
(1) shows, GASB 45 has a positive and statistically significant effect (p=0.05) at the 
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beginning of implementation. The size of the effect is about 0.19, while the standard 
deviation of bond yields in the sample is about 1.3. Thus, GASB 45 increases borrowing 
costs of counties by about 15% of a standard deviation in its initial implementation. The 
variable years after GASB 45 has negative and statistically significant effects (p=0.05) on 
borrowing costs. The exception is that the dummy variables indicating one and two years 
after GASB 45 are not statistically significant. All interactions should be interpreted as a 
group, however, and all reduce yields relative to the year of implementation.  
Based on results in column (1) of Table 3.3, Figure 3.1 shows the total effect of 
GASB 45 on county borrowing costs. The horizontal axis represents the number of years 
after GASB 45, with the number of years before GASB 45 coded as negative. The 
vertical line shows 0 years after GASB 45, or the time when the implementation of 
GASB 45 started. This corresponds to December 15 of 2006 for Phase 1 county 
governments, 2007 for Phase 2 county governments, and 2008 for Phase 3 county 
governments. The line in the middle shows the total effect of GASB 45. The line on the 
top shows the upper bound of 95% confidence interval, while the line in the bottom 
shows the lower bound of 95% confidence interval. As Figure 3.1 shows, the total effect 
of GASB 45 is positive and statistically significant (p=0.05) in the year of 
implementation and the two subsequent years. It becomes statistically insignificant since 
three years after GASB 45. Thus, the total effect of GASB 45 increases at the beginning 
of its implementation and decreases to zero at the end of two years after its 
implementation.  
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Figure 3. 1 Impact of GASB 45 on County Borrowing Costs 
 
The effects of GASB 45 on county government borrowing costs are consistent 
with the two hypotheses. First, overall, the total effect of GASB 45 is positive, indicating 
that GASB 45 increases county borrowing costs. This may result from the scenario (1) in 
the first hypothesis that GASB 45 reveals OPEB financial condition sufficiently worse 
than previously observed by bond investors. Second, the disappearance of GASB 45 
effect two years later and beyond indicates that the municipal bond market has already 
incorporated the information by that point.   
The control variables show results consistent with existing literature. At the bond 
level, lower credit ratings, no credit ratings, longer time to maturity, callable option, and 
Bond Buyer Index are associated with higher borrowing costs. Bond characteristics that 
decrease borrowing costs include bond insurance, par values, competitive sale, refunding 
62 
 
issue, general obligation, and bank qualified. Similarly, the control variables at the 
government level show results as expected. Larger sizes of intergovernmental revenue 
and higher levels of unemployment rate are associated with higher borrowing costs. On 
the other hand, larger sizes of population are correlated with lower borrowing costs. All 
these effects are statistically significant at p≤0.01 level.  
The selection equation shows that county governments required to implement 
GASB 45 are more likely to issue bonds. All the results for control variables are 
consistent with expectation. County governments with more debt outstanding, higher 
levels of income per capita, larger population sizes, and larger sizes of total expenditure 
are more likely to issue bonds. County governments are less likely to issue bonds when 
they have more own source revenues, receive more federal fiscal transfers, or there are 
higher levels of unemployment rates.  
Heterogeneous Effects 
The impacts of GASB 45 on borrowing costs can be heterogeneous across two 
factors. First, GASB 45 should have a larger impact on borrowing costs for local 
governments issuing bonds of lower credit quality. Lower credit quality 11  may have 
incorporated worse OPEB financial conditions to the extent that rating agencies have 
obtained such information before GASB 45. Thus, credit ratings can be used as a proxy 
for the observed OPEB financial condition by bond investors before GASB 45. In 
addition, governments issuing bonds of lower credit quality are more likely to disclose 
                                                
11 Because insured bonds carry the ratings of bond insurance firms regardless 
of their underlining ratings, an alternative specification is to estimate the model for 
uninsured bonds only. The results are robust.  
 
63 
 
worse OPEB financial conditions after GASB 45. Hence, credit ratings serve as a proxy 
for the content of information disclosed ex post.  
Second, GASB 45 should have larger impacts on borrowing costs of the 
governments that comply more strictly with GAAP. Local governments vary in their 
compliance with GASB regulations. Moreover, “the GASB has no power to force state 
and local governments to adopt its standards” (Antonio, 1985: p. 34). State regulations on 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) determine whether it is mandatory or 
voluntary to comply with GASB statements. The compliance becomes mandatory if a 
state has adopted GAAP. Local governments in non-GAAP states may also comply 
voluntarily because of pressure from municipal bond markets or audit requirements 
(GAO, 2008). On overage, local governments in GAAP states should be more likely to 
comply with GASB 45 than those in non-GAAP states. The more likely that local 
governments comply with GASB 45, the larger the impacts of GASB 45 should be.  
Table 3.3 shows the results of heterogeneous effects of GASB 45 estimated with 
Heckman selection models. Column (3) shows the results controlling for an interaction 
term between GASB 45 and credit rating. Column (4) shows the results controlling for an 
interaction term between GASB 45 and GAAP. Both columns show the results of outcome 
equations of Heckman selection model, while the selection equations are not reported 
because they are similar to results in column (2).  
As expected, the effects of GASB 45 on borrowing costs are larger for county 
governments issuing bonds of lower credit ratings and required to comply with GAAP. 
First, as column (3) shows, the interaction term GASB 45 ×credit rating has a positive 
and statistically significant (p≤0.01) effect on borrowing costs. Because credit rating is 
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coded so that larger values indicate lower level of credit quality, this suggests that GASB 
45 has larger effects on borrowing costs when the issued bonds have lower credit ratings. 
Second, as column (4) shows, the interaction term GASB 45 ×GAAP has a negative and 
statistically significant (p≤0.01) effect on county government borrowing costs. Since the 
variable GAAP is coded so that a larger value means less stringent state regulation to 
follow GAAP, this suggests that GASB 45 has larger effects on borrowing costs for the 
county governments required to comply with GAAP. Besides, the key independent 
variables GASB 45 and years after GASB 45 show the same pattern of effects as the 
model with no interaction terms shown in column (1). The control variables also show 
robust results. This suggests that the model is robust with additional control of interaction 
terms.  
Robustness Checks 
The empirical results are robust across four checks of which results are available 
on request. First, as a baseline model, a fixed-effect model is estimated with the control 
of county and year fixed effects. The results are consistent with that of Heckman 
selection model. Second, as an alternative specification, the fixed-effect model controls 
for month fixed effects to reduce the concern of serial correlation if not many counties 
issue multiple series of bonds in a single month. The results are robust. Third, an 
instrumental variable regression with ending dates of fiscal year as an instrumental 
variable shows that treating GASB 45 as exogenous may underestimate its impact on 
borrowing costs. This implies that the estimated effect of GASB 45 can be a lower bound 
of its true effect. Fourth, the results are generally consistent across county and city 
governments. A similar sample of data has been constructed for cities. The results 
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estimated with fixed-effect model show consistent results as for the county sample. Given 
the institutional differences between these two forms of local governments, empirical 
tests for both enhance external validity of the results.  
Conclusion and Discussion 
As the disclosure requirement of OPEB plans, GASB 45 can have both direct and 
indirect effects on government borrowing costs. The direct effect results from the 
decrease of the uncertainty premium required by bond investors when there is more 
financial disclosure and less information asymmetry. The indirect effect results from the 
change of observed financial condition of OPEB plans by bond investors with access to 
new information disclosed under GASB 45. The theoretical framework predicts that the 
total effects of GASB 45 on borrowing costs are conditional on the effects of financial 
disclosure on observed OPEB financial condition. Moreover, the market efficiency 
hypothesis predicts that the impact of GASB 45 may diminish over time.  
The empirical examination shows results consistent with both predictions. First, 
GASB 45 has a positive effect on borrowing costs of county governments. Under the 
theoretical framework, this indicates that counties have disclosed OPEB information that 
shows the financial condition of their OPEB plans is sufficiently worse than previously 
known by bond investors. Second, the impact of GASB 45 has become smaller as the 
number of years after its implementation increases. While the market response reaches 
the peak at the beginning, it decreases over time and disappears after the first two years 
of implementation. This is consistent with market efficiency hypothesis in that the bond 
market reacts to new information disclosed under GASB 45.  
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In addition, the effects of GASB 45 are heterogeneous across two dimensions. 
First, GASB 45 has a larger impact on borrowing costs of county governments when they 
issue bonds of lower credit ratings. Lower credit quality of bonds signifies the disclosure 
of information about worse OPEB financial condition. Second, GASB 45 increases 
borrowing costs more for counties that are required to adopt GAAP than those partially or 
not required to adopt it. GAAP serves as a proxy for the level of compliance with GASB 
45. Both heterogeneous effects build up confidence for the main results that GASB 45 
increases borrowing costs of county governments.  
The finding that GASB 45 increases borrowing costs has two critical policy 
implications. First, it provides indirect evidence that county governments have disclosed 
OPEB information that leads bond investors to downgrade considerably the financial 
condition of their OPEB plans. This indicates that local governments can save borrowing 
costs by improving the financial condition of OPEB plans. Second, it may inform the 
decisions for local governments to comply with GASB 75 on OPEB disclosure by 
highlighting the short-term costs of compliance. In the long run, nonetheless, GASB 45 
may benefit local governments by improving efficiency of resource allocation in the 
municipal bond market.  
More generally, it appears that financial disclosure under GASB 45 improves 
fiscal transparency and accountability by exposing greater borrowing costs for local 
governments disclosing more OPEB debts. The results that GASB 45 generates new 
information used in municipal bond pricing imply an improvement in fiscal transparency 
of government OPEB plans. Increased borrowing costs for local governments disclosing 
more OPEB debts represent an important way that the municipal bond market holds local 
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governments accountable. Thus, this study sheds light on the effects of financial 
disclosure on its output and outcome in the form of fiscal transparency and accountability. 
Future studies may examine broader consequences of financial disclosure and various 
ways that disclosure, transparency, and accountability can be connected.  
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Chapter 4 Does OPEB Funding Impact Municipal Borrowing Costs? 
Introduction 
Fiscal transparency is indispensable for citizens to hold democratic governments 
accountable. Under leadership of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board 
(GASB), local governments in the U.S. have made continuous efforts to improve fiscal 
transparency in recent decades. In addition to GASB Statement No. 34 that regulates 
government-wide financial reporting and GASB Statement No. 27 for pension reporting, 
GASB issued Statements No. 43 and No. 45 to regulate financial reporting for the other 
postemployment benefits (OPEB) plans in 2004. Furthermore, GASB 45 was replaced by 
GASB 75 in 2015, which is the most recent step in improving fiscal transparency of 
OPEB plans.  
To evaluate benefits and costs of these efforts to improve government fiscal 
transparency, it is critical to examine whether the disclosed information is used by 
intended users. Beyond the public, stakeholders in the municipal bond market represent a 
special group of users of government financial information. This information is crucial 
for municipal bond pricing. Financial disclosure and fiscal transparency reduce 
information asymmetry and improve efficiency of resource allocation in the municipal 
bond market. This paper examines whether the information disclosed under GASB 45 is 
used by the stakeholders in the bond market. More specifically, it examines the impacts 
of reported information about the funding status of OPEB plans on borrowing costs of 
county and city governments.  
In addition, as providers of financial information, local governments may face 
tradeoffs between benefits and costs in deciding whether to disclose OPEB information in 
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compliance with GASB 45. Given the large sizes of unfunded OPEB liabilities, an even 
more important decision for them is how to fund OPEB plans. Understanding the impacts 
of disclosed information on their borrowing costs can inform both decisions. As a 
preview, this study finds that reported information on improved OPEB funding decreases 
borrowing costs of county and city governments. The study contributes to existing 
literature by examining the impacts of OPEB funding on borrowing costs and modelling 
OPEB and pension funding at the same time.  
Other Postemployment Benefits (OPEB) and Previous Research 
The other postemployment benefits (OPEB) include retiree health care, life 
insurance, disability payments, and long-term care. The major part of OPEB is retiree 
healthcare benefits. Local governments subsidize health insurance premiums for retirees. 
Alternatively, the subsidy becomes implicit in that local governments allow retirees to 
stay in the same health insurance pool with active employees, who are usually younger, 
healthier, and thus cheaper to insure. While many local governments subsidize health 
insurance costs for retirees until they qualify for Medicare at age 65, others continue the 
subsidy beyond 65 (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2013).   
OPEB differs from pensions in important ways (GAO, 2007). First, while 
pensions are legally protected, OPEB is not guaranteed under state laws. OPEB is subject 
to negotiations between governments and unions. Compared to pensions, local 
governments have more flexibility to make changes to their OPEB plans. Second, 
pensions are generally managed as trust funds, while OPEB is usually treated as 
operating expenses. Third, most pensions are prefunded, but OPEB is funded on a pay-as-
you-go basis, in which payments are made to retirees from annual operating funds.  
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Before 2005, the costs of local government OPEB plans were not transparent 
because most local governments finance OPEB on a pay-as-you-go basis. In 2004, the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) issued Statement No. 45 to require 
local governments to report their OPEB costs on an actuarial accounting basis12. GASB 
45 allows for a phase-in implementation period of three years between 2006 and 2008. 
Since 2008, many local governments have reported OPEB costs in their Comprehensive 
Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) for the first time.  
As more data on OPEB plans became available, researchers have estimated the 
total costs of OPEB. Estimation of OPEB liabilities is complicated by varied assumptions 
about investment returns, employee turnover, and changes of healthcare costs over the 
long term. But the consensus is that the unfunded OPEB liabilities are huge in the state 
and local public sector. For example, Zion and Varshney (2007) estimate $558 billion 
unfunded OPEB liabilities for the 50 states, and $951 billion for local governments. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates that the total OPEB liabilities are 
between $600 billion and $1.6 trillion for state and local governments (GAO, 2008).  
In the long run, local governments will face increasing fiscal pressure to finance 
their OPEB plans. McNichol (2008) estimates that total OPEB liabilities for state and 
local governments range from $1 trillion to $1.3 trillion in the next 30 years. The GAO 
concludes that “estimated future retiree health care costs would more than double by the 
year 2050 if they continue to be funded on a pay-as-you-go basis” (GAO, 2007). The 
                                                
12 There is a related GASB Statement No. 43 that applies a similar financial 
reporting standard to managers of OPEB plans. GASB 43 was implemented one year 
earlier than GASB 45 and in a transition period of three years starting from 2005. 
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increase of OPEB costs is driven mainly by the general rise of healthcare costs, which is 
out of control by local governments.  
Even for local governments that do not plan to prefund OPEB plans in the short 
term, the long-term fiscal challenges will have profound influences on local government 
budgets. Among policy implications of the increasing unfunded OPEB liabilities are the 
impacts on local government borrowing costs. Local governments borrow extensively in 
the municipal bond market. From the perspective of bond stakeholders, unfunded OPEB 
liabilities represent a significant risk factor in pricing bonds issued by local governments.  
Both the size of OPEB liabilities and their funding progress may influence 
borrowing costs of local governments. Marlowe (2007) finds that the size of OPEB 
liabilities does not have a direct effect on municipal credit ratings. However, local 
governments with high OPEB liabilities and low fiscal capacity are more likely to see 
their credit ratings decline. Due to a lack of data, Marlowe’s empirical analysis is based 
on predicted levels of OPEB liabilities instead of reported OPEB liabilities by local 
governments. Matkin and Krivosheyev (2012) find preliminary evidence that local 
governments earn higher credit ratings by reducing OPEB liabilities.  
While this study examines the impact of information disclosed under GASB 45, 
previous studies have investigated the impact of information disclosed under different 
GASB requirements. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 34 
requires state and local governments to restructure financial reporting. Scholars have 
examined the impact of new information disclosed under GASB 34 on the municipal 
bond market. Specifically, new information under GASB 34 is reflected in credit ratings 
of states (Johnson, Kioko, and Hildreth, 2012), Texas school districts (Plummer, 
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Hutchison, and Patton, 2007), and cities (Pridgen and Wilder, 2013; Benson and Marks, 
2014). Moreover, financial disclosure under GASB 34 provides incremental information 
for assessing municipal insurance costs (Benson and Marks, 2014) and municipal 
borrowing costs (Reck and Wilson, 2014). These studies indicate that new financial 
information resulting from GASB disclosure changes can have significant impacts on the 
municipal bond market.  
OPEB Funding, Pension Funding, and Borrowing Costs 
As more information about OPEB plans is disclosed under GASB 43 and 45, local 
governments may face increasing political pressure to finance their OPEB plans. While 
they have certain leeway to change OPEB plans to reduce OPEB levels, the changes 
often target new hires and are constrained by the necessity of attracting employees of 
high quality (Coggburn and Kearney, 2010). It is unlikely for local governments to 
eliminate OPEB plans at low cost. Thus, unfunded OPEB liabilities represent potential 
expenditures to be met in the future.  
Demands for funding OPEB plans can reduce fiscal flexibility of local 
governments and make them more vulnerable to revenue shocks in economic downturns, 
which increases default risks of government bonds (Marlowe, 2007). As McNichol (2008) 
put it, if the OPEB “liability is large and the state does not have a plan to address it, this 
could affect a state’s bond rating and the cost of borrowing money” (p.4). This may also 
apply to OPEB plans of local governments. On the contrary, if a government makes 
progress on funding OPEB plans, it is less likely to be constrained by OPEB expenses in 
the future. This will decrease default risks for the bonds issued by that government and 
reduce its borrowing costs.  
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In addition, OPEB funding can influence borrowing costs of local governments by 
affecting their credit ratings. Credit rating agencies have made it clear that they consider 
unfunded OPEB liabilities as a risk factor. Standard and Poor’s reports that “despite 
many states’ ability to change OPEB benefits, thus reducing liabilities, OPEB ratios still 
matter to credit quality” (2016). Specifically, Standard and Poor’s scores general 
obligation bond of local governments negatively if it has “an unaddressed exposure to 
large unfunded pension or OPEB obligations, leading to accelerating payment obligations 
over the medium term that represent significant budget pressure. If there is a plan to 
address the obligations, the final score worsens by one point; otherwise, the score 
worsens by two points” (2013). Thus, while a larger size of unfunded OPEB liabilities 
decreases credit quality, more funding progress increases it. As credit quality of a 
government increases, it will have lower borrowing costs.  
OPEB funding can be measured by two indicators, including percentage of ARC 
contributed and funded ratio. First, the percentage of ARC contributed, or annual 
employer contribution as a percentage of annual required contribution (ARC) of OPEB 
plans, shows the progress made by a government to fund an OPEB plan on an accrual 
basis. This is a measure of the short-term funding status of OPEB plans. Second, the 
funded ratio, or total assets divided by total liabilities of an OPEB plan, shows the extent 
to which current assets cover actuarially accrued benefits. This is a measure of the long-
term funding position. When percentage of ARC contributed or funded ratio increases, 
OPEB funding improves. Improvements of OPEB funding decrease default risks of bonds 
issued by local governments and reduce their borrowing costs.  
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Like OPEB funding, pension funding can influence local government borrowing 
costs. Many studies have examined the impacts of pension funding on municipal bond 
market outcomes. First, Copeland and Ingram (1983) find no association between various 
pension fund ratios and municipal bond yields and credit ratings in the secondary market. 
Second, unfunded pension liabilities are positively associated with bond prices in the 
secondary bond market. Raman and Wilson (1990) find that unfunded pension 
obligations of cities are partially reflected in bond prices. Third, the investment 
performance of state pension funds influences their borrowing costs. Novy-Marx and 
Rauh (2012) find that state investment losses of pension funds in the Great Recession 
increased borrowing costs. Fourth, the funding performance of pension funds affects state 
credit quality in the bond market. Martell, Kioko, and Moldogaziev (2013) find that as 
pension funded ratios of states decrease, they are more likely to receive lower credit 
ratings and negative rating outlooks. None of these studies, however, has examined the 
impacts of pension funding on borrowing costs of local governments in the primary bond 
market.  
More importantly, none has examined the impacts of OPEB funding and pension 
funding simultaneously. This becomes feasible only when local governments report 
information on both OPEB and pension plans on their CAFRs since 2008. As two major 
parts of postemployment benefits offered by local governments, OPEB funding and 
pension funding can be either substitutes or complements. They are substitutes if 
governments increase OPEB funding at the expense of pension funding, or vice versa. 
Modelling pension funding only may overestimate the total liabilities of pension and 
OPEB plans. They are complements if governments increase OPEB funding in proportion 
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to pension funding. Modelling pension funding only will underestimate the total 
liabilities of pension and OPEB plans. By controlling for pension funding and OPEB 
funding in the same model, this study estimates the impacts of long-term debts resulting 
from postemployment benefits more precisely.  
Therefore, four hypotheses follow.  
H1: The percentage of ARC contributed of OPEB plans has negative effects on 
borrowing costs.  
H2: The funded ratios of OPEB plans have negative effects on borrowing costs.  
H3: The percentage of ARC contributed of pension plans has negative effects on 
borrowing costs.  
H4: The funded ratios of pension plans have negative effects on borrowing costs. 
 
Data and Method 
Data and Sample 
The data on OPEB and pension funding come from the Financial Indicators 
Database. As a collection of comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFR) of local 
governments, this database is released by the Government Financial Officers Association 
(GFOA). Because the database covers only local governments participating voluntarily in 
the Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in Financial Reporting Program offered by 
GFOA, it is not a random sample of the population of local governments.  
The Financial Indicators Database does, however, represent the main source of 
CAFR data of a national sample of local governments that has been used widely in 
previous studies (Ingram and DeJong, 1987; Reck and Wilson, 2006). Evans and Patton 
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(1983) find that, compared to an average city, cities participating in the GFOA’s program 
have more debt, more professional officials, a manager form of government, and locate in 
states adopting GAAP. Moreover, previous studies have used participation in the 
GFOA’s award program as an indicator of high quality of financial management (Benson 
and Marks, 2014). This implies that counties and cities in the sample are more likely to 
borrow and have higher quality of financial management.   
I focus on the counties and cities repeatedly participating in the GFOA’s program 
and covered by the Financial Indicators Database between 1999 and 2014 13 . The 
objective is to construct a panel of counties and cities so that unobserved, time-invariant 
factors can be controlled by fixed effects. Though GASB 45 requires phase-in 
implementation for local governments starting from 2006, counties and cities did not 
disclose OPEB information until 200814. Thus, this present analysis focuses on the period 
between 2008 and 2014.   
Data on bonds issued by counties and cities in the primary bond market come 
from Bloomberg. These data provide information about bond characteristics such as yield 
at issue and credit ratings. To construct the county sample based on the GFOA data, I 
identify 268 counties that repeatedly participate in the GFOA’s program between 1999 
and 2014. These counties are then matched with all the bonds they issued in the same 
period.  
                                                
13 Under GASB 45, local governments are required to disclose OPEB information 
starting from different years based on their revenue sizes in 1999. The Financial 
Indicators Database covers data between 1995 and 2014. Thus, focusing on the period 
between 1999 and 2014 allows one to observe a 15-year panel of cities and counties 
subject to GASB 45.  
14 This does not necessarily mean that counties and cities have not complied with 
GASB 45 before 2008. It is possible to comply but report zeros on key indicators of 
OPEB plans at the beginning of transition years. 
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Counties must meet three conditions to remain in the final sample. First, counties 
must issue at least one bond in the period of study. Otherwise, their borrowing costs are 
unobservable in the sample. Between 2008 and 2014, 194 of the 268 counties issued 
16,182 bonds. Second, it is only feasible to study the impacts of OPEB funding on 
borrowing costs when information on OPEB funding is reported in the GFOA database. 
The counties with zero assets and liabilities in OPEB plans and thus undefined funded 
ratios must be excluded. Zero OPEB assets and liabilities can result from three 
possibilities: (1) the governments do not have OPEB plans, (2) the governments have 
OPEB plans but do not comply with GASB 45 in reporting OPEB information, and (3) 
the governments comply with GASB 45 but report zero liabilities. At the beginning of 
transition years of GASB 45 implementation, zero OPEB liabilities and assets are 
consistent with GASB guidelines. Per GASB 45, “because retroactive application of the 
measurement requirements of this Statement is not required, for most employers the 
OPEB liability at the beginning of the transition year will be zero” (GASB, 2004). In all 
three cases, the observations must be excluded from the final sample.  
It is feasible to distinguish the first and second cases based on the reported 
number of OPEB plans in the GFOA database. In the final sample, 164 counties report 
positive OPEB assets or liabilities. Specifically, 56 counties have zero OPEB plans and 
report no assets and liabilities; 2 counties have at least one OPEB plans but report no 
OPEB assets and liabilities. This indicates that most counties complied with GASB 45 in 
reporting OPEB information. This is not surprising given that these counties repeatedly 
participate in the GFOA’s award program between 2008 and 2014, an indicator of high 
quality of financial management. This further implies that the selection problem does not 
78 
 
become severe by focusing on counties chosen to comply with GASB 45 among those 
participating in the GFOA’s program.  
Third, between 2008 and 2014, counties must report positive assets and liabilities 
of pension plans to remain in the final sample because pension funding status is also 
controlled in the model. Among the 194 counties that have issued bonds, 114 counties 
report positive pension assets or liabilities. Among the excluded counties, 87 of them do 
not have pension plans and report zero pension assets and liabilities; 1 county has at least 
one pension plan but reports zero assets and liabilities. The counties reporting no pension 
plans may participate in pension plans offered by states.  
In the city sample, 1008 cities repeatedly participate in the Financial Indicators 
Database between 1999 and 2014. They are matched with all the bonds issued in the 
same period. Between 2008 and 2014, 674 of the 1008 cities issued 55,405 bonds. 
Similarly, cities are excluded from the sample if they have zero assets and liabilities of 
OPEB and pension plans. For OPEB plans, 271 cities report that they have no OPEB 
plans and zero assets and liabilities; 8 cities report that they have at least one OPEB plans 
but zero assets and liabilities. In the final sample, 516 cities report positive OPEB assets 
or liabilities. For pension plans, 203 cities report zero pension plans as well as zero assets 
and liabilities; 5 cities report a positive number of pension plans but zero assets and 
liabilities. In the final sample, 484 cities report positive pension assets or liabilities. This 
also suggests that, conditional on having pension plans, selection into pension disclosure 
is not a substantial concern.  
Furthermore, there are extreme values of the two financial indicators of funding 
status, including percentage of ARC contributed and funded ratios. These may result 
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from data entry errors when counties or cities prepare for CAFRs, or when the GFOA 
compiles the CAFR data. Manual checks of dozens of original CAFRs show that data 
errors include inconsistent coding of percent and percentage points, wrong units, or 
wrong years, among others. In some cases, the extreme values may be valid entries but 
outliers, which can unduly influence the results of estimation. Ideally, one may check 
with the authors of the CAFR data to confirm whether these extreme values are valid. 
This may result in high cost of data cleaning given that there are hundreds of counties and 
cities in the sample.  
A more feasible solution, in contrast, is to use the Winsorizing procedure 
(“winsor”) to treat these extreme values. Specifically, for each key financial indicator, 
values above the 99th percentile are replaced by the values at the 99th percentile, while 
values below the 1st percentile are replaced by the values at the 1st percentile. Thus, an 
extremely large value is still treated as largest and an extremely small value is still treated 
as smallest. The advantage is that it keeps the sample size and does not alter the sample 
distribution between 1st and 99th percentiles. An alternative option is to trim the data, or 
to code the values above 99th percentile and below 1st percentile as missing. While it has 
the advantage of avoiding the potentially arbitrary assumption that extremely large values 
should be large even after recoding, this procedure may result in decreases in sample size. 
As a robustness check, the models are estimated with the samples treated in both ways. 
The results are robust and slightly stronger when trimming the extreme values. 
Nonetheless, only the Winsorized results are reported below.  
Moreover, counties and cities can have more than one type of pension plan, with 
differential impacts on their borrowing costs. The default risks resulting from pension 
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funding are only relevant if they have defined benefit plans or defined benefit parts of 
hybrid plans. If a defined benefit plan is unfunded, it represents a fiscal constraint on 
government budgets because it is government employers that bear risks of underfunding. 
In contrast, governments are free of fiscal pressure if they make annual required 
contributions to a defined contribution plan. Government employees will bear risks of 
underfunding under such plans. For a defined contribution plan, governments will only 
incur liabilities if their actual contribution is less than the required contribution, which 
will not concern bond investors as much as a defined benefit plan.  
Though these are important differences between defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans, the GFOA database has no measure of the type of pension plans. To 
proceed, I assume that each county or city government that reports positive actuarially 
accrued liabilities must have at least one defined benefit plan, and thus is relevant for 
bond pricing. This assumption is plausible for three reasons. First, per GASB Statement 
No. 27 that applies to accounting and financial reporting for pensions before 2014, local 
governments are not required to report unfunded liabilities for their defined contribution 
plans. Instead, they are only required to report required and actual annual contributions 
separately. While unfunded liabilities are easy to calculate, it is unlikely for the GFOA to 
do such calculations based on these parameters when compiling the Financial Indicators 
Database. 
Second, manual checks of CAFRs of about 150 cities find that only a few of them 
have defined contribution plans as supplements to defined benefit plans; none has only 
defined contribution plans. When a city has a defined contribution plan, it does not report 
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positive actuarially accrued liabilities on that plan. This is consistent with the disclosure 
requirement for such plans under GASB 27.   
Third, the assumption will not hold if a county or city without defined benefit 
plans reports liabilities for a defined contribution plan. Had this occurred, the irrelevant 
unfunded liabilities for defined contribution plans are misclassified as unfunded liabilities 
for defined benefit plans. Even so, no positive values of actuarial accrued pension assets 
will be reported. This would lead to overestimation of pension liabilities and 
underestimation of pension assets, and thus underestimation of funded ratios. In addition, 
counties and cities are not required to report percentage of ARC contributed for defined 
contribution plans under GASB 27. In these cases, percentage of ARC contributed are 
coded as zero in the GFOA database. But it is infeasible to distinguish this from zero 
percentage of ARC contributed for a defined benefit plans. This would lead to 
underestimation of percentage of ARC contributed for a county or city. For both financial 
indicators, the measurement errors may bias their effects toward zero. Thus, if this 
assumption fails, the estimated effects of percentage of ARC contributed and funded 
ratios underestimate their true effects.  
Econometric Method 
By construction, both the county and city samples are panels by county or city 
and by year. Since each county or city may issue new bonds in a year, the samples are not 
panel data by bond and by year. I estimate a fixed-effect panel model at the county or city 
level. This model has the advantage of accounting for time-invariant factors with the 
fixed effects of counties or cities, and years. This feature is particularly valuable for a 
study of local governments since longitudinal data are often not readily available.  
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The fixed effects of counties or cities are assumed to control for three groups of 
time-invariant, unobservable factors. First, the institutional environments where counties 
or cities function may affect OPEB or pension funding and their borrowing costs. For 
example, scholars find that cities in states with stricter tax and expenditure limits (TELs) 
have lower OPEB funded ratios (Maher, Park, and Harrold, 2016). The TELs have also 
been shown to affect credit ratings and borrowing costs of local governments (Johnson 
and Kriz, 2005; Palumbo and Zaporowski, 2012). If the TELs remain largely the same 
between 2008 and 2014 for counties or cities in the sample, they can be controlled by 
fixed effects. Furthermore, the governmental form of counties or cities may affect OPEB 
or pension funding and borrowing costs. A county or city with professional managers 
may have higher quality of financial management, lower levels of unfunded OPEB or 
pension liabilities, and thus lower levels of borrowing costs. Since it is unlikely for a 
substantial proportion of cities or counties to change their forms between 2008 and 2014, 
government forms can be controlled by fixed effects.  
Second, the county or city fixed effects account for the accounting methods used 
to estimate assets and liabilities of OPEB or pension plans. To report annual costs on an 
actuarial basis, counties or cities must adopt certain cost allocation methods to amortize 
total liabilities over a long term. For example, they must choose such accounting methods 
as aggregate cost or project unit credit. These cost allocation methods may bias the 
observed OPEB or pension costs upward or downward. The GFOA data report cost 
allocation methods for each OPEB or pension plan. An examination of these methods 
finds that their standard deviations are extremely small in both county and city samples. 
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This indicates that, once adopted, counties and cities rarely change these methods. Thus, 
the impacts of accounting methods can be controlled by county or city fixed effects.  
Third, the county or city fixed effects account for the accounting assumptions 
underlining the reported assets and liabilities of OPEB or pension plans. To estimate 
OPEB or pension liabilities or assets, counties or cities must make several assumptions, 
including the expected returns of investments of pension funds, the growth rates of 
healthcare costs, or the turnover rates of future employees. These assumptions can change 
the estimated assets or liabilities of OPEB and pensions. They are not observable in the 
GFOA data. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that counties or cities apply 
consistent or the same assumptions between 2008 and 2014.  
The fixed effect model also includes year fixed effects to account for the 
unobserved factors that may affect all the counties or cities in a year15. One of such 
factors is the Great Recession since 2007. The economic downturns can influence OPEB 
and pension funding, as well as borrowing costs of county or city governments. Since the 
influences are present for all counties or cities, they can be controlled by fixed effects16.  
There can be arguments for and against controlling for both percentage of ARC 
contributed and funded ratios in the same model. On one hand, as percentage of ARC 
contributed increases, funded ratios are likely to increase because employer contribution 
is an important source of funding for OPEB and pension plans. Given this mechanical 
link, it may be misleading to interpret the coefficient of the percentage of ARC 
                                                
15 The results are robust when including month fixed effects. In the next step, the 
model controlling for month fixed effects will be compared to that estimated with year 
fixed effects. 
16 To the extent that the impacts of economic recessions differ across counties and 
cities, the model controls for unemployment rates for the county sample. But the data of 
unemployment rates are not available for the city sample.  
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contributed as the marginal change in borrowing costs while holding the funded ratio 
constant. On the other hand, changes in employer percentage of ARC contributed do not 
necessarily cause changes in funded ratios. Employee contributions or investment returns 
may also change funded ratios. Given this probabilistic correlation, including only one of 
them may cause omitted variable bias. To test whether the results are robust with the 
inclusion of one or both variables, the model is estimated with and without percentage of 
ARC contributed controlled in addition to funded ratios.  
Model Specification 
The dependent variable is yield at issue, a measure of borrowing costs of counties 
or cities. Bond yield is a widely used measure of borrowing cost in previous studies 
(Capeci, 1991; Capeci, 1994; Fairchild and Koch, 1998). As an internal rate of return 
equalizing bond price with present value of bond proceeds, bond yield accounts for the 
time value of money.  
Key Independent Variables 
The key independent variables are two financial indicators of funding status of 
OPEB and pension plans. First, percentage of OPEB ARC contributed, calculated as 
annual employer contribution as a percentage of annual required contribution of OPEB 
plans, measures short-term funding progress. The GFOA data show the percentage of 
ARC contributed for each OPEB plan, while many counties or cities have multiple plans. 
Presumably, for the same level of percentage of ARC contributed, a larger size of 
contribution must be made for a plan with larger liability than that with smaller liability. 
The larger the size of the contribution becomes, the larger its impact on the government 
budget. To reflect the differences of liability sizes across OPEB plans, the percentage of 
85 
 
ARC contributed for a county or city is weighted by the size of the liability for each 
OPEB plan. If the first hypothesis holds, percentage of OPEB ARC contributed should 
have a negative effect on borrowing costs.  
Second, OPEB funded ratio, or total assets divided by total liabilities, measures 
the long-term funding position of OPEB plans. In the GFOA data, counties or cities 
report assets and liabilities for each OPEB plan. To calculate the funded ratio for the 
counties or cities with multiple OPEB plans, assets and liabilities are added up across 
OPEB plans to reach total assets and total liabilities. If the second hypothesis holds, the 
OPEB funded ratio should have a negative effect on borrowing costs.  
To measure funding status of pension plans, indicators of percentage of pension 
ARC contributed and pension funded ratio are calculated in the same way as for OPEB 
plans. If the third and fourth hypotheses hold, both variables should have negative effects 
on borrowing costs.  
Consistent with previous studies (Capeci, 1991; Martell, Kioko, and Moldogaziev, 
2013; Palumbo and Zaporowski, 2012; Johnson and Kriz, 2005; Marlowe, 2007), the 
model controls for two groups of variables. One is to capture characteristics of bonds; 
another is to capture the economic, fiscal and demographic features of counties or cities 
that issue bonds.  
Control Variables: Bond Level 
Ln of time to maturity: This is the natural log of the number of days from issuing 
date to maturity date for a bond. As the time to maturity increases, bond default risks 
increase because of higher uncertainty over a longer term. Thus, this variable should be 
positively associated with borrowing costs. Credit rating: This is credit ratings of bonds 
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by Standard & Poor’s. It is coded as an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 1617, from 
highest to lowest rating. Lower credit ratings represent higher default risks, and thus are 
associated with higher borrowing costs. Hence, this variable should have positive effects 
on borrowing costs. No rating: This is a dummy variable indicating whether there is no 
credit rating for a bond. Bonds assigned no rating by Standard & Poor’s may represent 
differential default risks from those with ratings. In addition, credit ratings are missing 
for some bonds because of errors in downloading bond data from Bloomberg. To account 
for the possibility that bonds with missing rating information differ from others, a dummy 
variable missing rating is controlled in the model. The signs of the effects of both no 
rating and missing rating are unclear.  
Callable: This is a dummy variable indicating whether a bond is callable. For a 
callable bond, governments can pay it off before the maturity date. This creates higher 
uncertainty from the perspective of bond investors because they may suffer investment 
losses if governments choose to pay off the bond when the interest rate is low. Thus, 
callable bonds are associated with higher borrowing costs. Competitive sale: This is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the bond is sold using the competitive method instead 
of the negotiated method. Competitive sale may reduce borrowing costs by competition 
among underwriters (Peng and Brucato, 2001). Therefore, this variable should have a 
negative effect on borrowing costs.  
Ln of par value: This is the natural log of the issue size of a bond measured in 
dollars. Because of economies of scale, bonds with larger issue sizes may be associated 
with lower borrowing costs. On the other hand, issue sizes may increase borrowing costs 
                                                
17 In the county sample, credit rating ranges from 1 to 11. In the city sample, it 
ranges from 1 to 16.  
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because it may be difficult for underwriters to place large issues in the bond market 
(Fairchild and Koch, 1998). Thus, the sign of the effect of this variable is unclear.  
Insured: This is a dummy variable indicating whether a bond is insured by a third 
party. If a bond is insured, the third party will make debt payments should a default occur. 
For bond investors, an insured bond has lower default risks due to this credit 
enhancement. On the other hand, issuers of bonds with lower credit quality are more 
likely to purchase bond insurance in the first place. It is likely that, even with insurance, 
these bonds still have lower credit quality than uninsured bonds. Therefore, the effect of 
this variable on borrowing costs is indeterminate. In the city sample, some bonds have 
missing information on bond insurance. A dummy variable missing insured is controlled 
to account for potential differential effects of these bonds on borrowing costs.   
Refunding issue: This is a dummy variable indicating whether a bond is a 
refunding issue. In a refunding issue, governments issue new bonds to finance old bonds 
to take advantage of low interest rates. If refunding issues do save them borrowing costs, 
this variable should have a negative sign. General obligation: This is a dummy variable 
indicating whether a bond is a general obligation bond. A general obligation bond is 
backed up with the full faith and credit of all government revenues. Because issuers offer 
stronger guarantee of repayments, general obligation bonds have lower default risks. 
Thus, general obligation should have a negative effect on borrowing costs.   
Tax exemption: This is a dummy variable indicating whether a bond qualifies for 
federal and state tax exemption for bond investors. For a tax-exempt bond, investors do 
not pay income taxes for earnings from bond investments. To reflect this tax advantage, 
tax-exempt bonds offer lower yields than taxable bonds. Hence, this variable should have 
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a negative effect on borrowing costs. Bond Buyer Index: This is the Bond Buyer 20 
general obligation bonds index in the week of bond issuance18. This index is to capture 
the fluctuations of interest rates in the bond market when a bond is issued. Given the 
positive correlation between market-wide interest rate and interest rate of a single bond, 
this variable should be positively correlated with borrowing costs.  
Control Variables: Government Level 
To measure the characteristics of counties or cities that issue bonds, the following 
variables are controlled. General fund revenue: This is total revenue in the government’s 
general fund. In the county sample, it is scaled by population size and measured in units 
of a million dollars. In the city sample, it is measured in units of a billion dollars19. A 
larger size of general fund revenue indicates that governments have more available fiscal 
resources to make debt payments, which should reduce default risks from the perspective 
of bond investors. Thus, this variable should have a negative effect on borrowing costs.  
Direct debt per capita: This is the general bonded debt of governmental activities, 
scaled by population and measured in units of a million dollars20. This variable does not 
capture all government debts. For example, if governments issue revenue bonds, the debt 
outstanding is not measured by this variable. Due to data availability in the GFOA 
database, however, this variable is used as a proxy for government debt burden. It should 
                                                
18 Bond Buyer Index is missing for bonds issued at some dates. In these cases, the 
Bond Buyer Index in the most recent week is used to replace the missing values.  
19 While it is not scaled by population, the model controls for population size.  
20 This variable is only controlled in the model for the county sample. For the city 
sample, there is multicollinearity between direct debt per capita and general fund revenue 
per capita (correlation coefficient is about 0.7). Therefore, only general fund revenue is 
controlled for the city sample.  
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be positively correlated with borrowing costs because larger sizes of direct debt indicate 
less fiscal flexibility and higher default risks.  
Ln of income per capita21: This is the natural log of personal income per capita at 
the county level. Higher levels of income per capita represent a stronger tax base and thus 
higher fiscal capacity for governments to pay back debts, which should be associated 
with lower borrowing costs. On the other hand, governments with higher levels of 
income per capita are more likely to borrow, resulting in larger sizes of debt outstanding. 
As they borrow more, the borrowing costs increase. Thus, the sign of the effect of this 
variable is unclear. Unemployment rate22: This is the annual unemployment rate at the 
county level. As unemployment rate increases in economic downturns, government 
revenues decrease and expenditures increase. Governments have less available fiscal 
resources to make debt payments, which increase default risks from the perspective of 
bond investors. Therefore, unemployment rate should have a positive effect on borrowing 
costs.  
Ln of population: This is the natural log of the size of population within the 
jurisdiction of a county or city. Larger population sizes indicate stronger fiscal capacity to 
pay back government debts, and thus this variable should have a negative effect on 
borrowing costs. More than three OPEB plans: This is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a county or city has more than three OPEB plans23. While many counties or 
                                                
21 The data are only available for the county sample.   
22 The data are only available for the county sample.   
23 This variable is not controlled for pension plans because of multicollinearity. 
This indicates that counties or cities with more than three OPEB plans coincide with 
those with more than three pension plans. Therefore, this variable may also capture the 
effects of having more than three pension plans on borrowing costs.  
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cities have more than three OPEB plans, they only report OPEB information for up to 
three plans in the GFOA database. This variable is to capture the effect of missing 
information on the funding status of more than three OPEB plans on borrowing costs.  
All the variables measured in dollars have been adjusted by the CPI to account for 
inflation. Table 4.1 shows a summary of variable description and data sources. Table 4.2 
shows summary statistics for the county sample. Table 4.3 shows summary statistics for 
the city sample.  
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Table 4. 1 Description of Variables  
Variable Name Description Data Sources 
Yield Yield at issue Bloomberg L.P. 
Percentage of ARC 
contributed 
Employer contribution as a percentage of 
annual required contribution (ARC) 
CAFR 
Funding ratio Total assets divided by total liabilities  CAFR 
   
Issue Characteristics   
Ln of time to Maturity The number of days from issuing date to 
maturity date in natural log form 
Bloomberg L.P. 
Credit rating Standard and Poor’s underlying ratings, 
ranging from 1 to 16, from highest to 
lowest rating 
Bloomberg L.P. 
No rating A dummy variable indicating whether 
there is no rating assigned for a bond 
Bloomberg L.P. 
Missing rating A dummy variable indicating whether the 
credit rating variable is missing for a bond 
Bloomberg L.P. 
Callable A dummy variable indicating whether the 
bond is callable 
Bloomberg L.P. 
Competitive A dummy variable indicating whether the 
bond is sold using the competitive rather 
than the negotiated method 
Bloomberg L.P. 
Ln of par value Issue size of a bond in dollars and natural 
log 
Bloomberg L.P. 
Insured A dummy variable indicating whether the 
bond is insured by a third party 
Bloomberg L.P. 
Insured missing A dummy variable indicating whether the 
bond insurance information is missing for 
a bond 
Bloomberg L.P. 
Refunding issue A dummy variable indicating whether the 
bond is a refunding issue 
Bloomberg L.P. 
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Table 4.1(Continued) 
General obligation A dummy variable indicating whether the 
bond is a general obligation bond 
Bloomberg L.P. 
Tax exemption A dummy variable indicating whether the 
bond is qualified for federal and state 
income tax exemption  
Bloomberg L.P. 
Bond Buyer Index Bond Buyer 20 GO Index in the week of 
issuing date of a bond 
The Bond Buyer 
Issuer Characteristics   
Total revenue in 
general fund 
Total revenue in the government’s general 
fund 
CAFR 
Direct debt per capita The general bonded debt of governmental 
activities 
CAFR 
Population Population size in a county or city  U.S. Census 
Bureau 
Unemployment rate Annual unemployment rate at county level U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
Income per capita Per capita personal income at county level U.S. Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis 
Three plus OPEB plans A dummy variable indicating whether a 
county or city has more than three OPEB 
plans.  
CAFR 
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Table 4. 2 Descriptive Statistics for the County Sample (2008-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean S.D. min max 
      
year 16,182   2008 2014 
Unemployment rate 16,182 7.475 2.374 2.500 17.40 
Ln of time to maturity 16,182 7.843 0.901 3.091 9.813 
Callable  16,182 0.396 0.489 0 1 
Competitive sale 16,063 0.506 0.500 0 1 
General obligation bond 16,181 0.784 0.411 0 1 
Tax exemption 16,182 0.584 0.493 0 1 
Refunding issue 16,182 0.101 0.301 0 1 
Yield  15,667 2.711 1.415 0.0800 10.25 
Bond Buyer Index 16,182 4.309 0.453 3.290 5.850 
Ln of population 16,165 12.96 1.026 9.219 16.17 
Credit rating 16,181 1.754 1.505 0 11 
More than three OPEB plans 16,182 0.0376 0.190 0 1 
Missing rating 16,182 0.171 0.377 0 1 
General fund revenue per capita 16,165 0.00232 0.0281 4.90e-05 3.568 
Ln of income per capita 16,182 11.48 0.267 10.79 12.28 
Direct debt per capita 16,165 1.796 1.671 0 9.508 
Ln of par value 16,014 14.99 1.546 9.281 21.77 
No rating 16,182 0.0150 0.121 0 1 
Insured  15,774 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Pension unfunded liabilities per capita 16,165 0.355 0.708 -0.191 5.645 
OPEB unfunded liabilities per capita 16,165 0.0109 0.0122 0 0.0457 
Percentage of OPEB ARC contributed 14,015 0.517 0.483 0 3.290 
Percentage of pension ARC 
contributed 
9,031 0.930 0.278 0.0641 5.243 
OPEB funded ratio 14,061 0.0609 0.144 0 0.901 
Pension funded ratio 9,031 0.667 0.302 0 1.122 
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Table 4. 3 Descriptive Statistics for the City Sample (2008-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean S.D. min max 
      
Year    2008 2014 
Ln of time to maturity 59,845 7.807 0.869 2.833 9.813 
callable 59,845 0.402 0.490 0 1 
Competitive sale 59,980 0.506 0.500 0 1 
Insured  60,076 0.0851 0.279 0 1 
Missing insured 60,076 0.0946 0.293 0 1 
General obligation 60,074 0.863 0.344 0 1 
Tax exemption 60,076 0.344 0.475 0 1 
Refunding issue 60,076 0.0805 0.272 0 1 
Credit rating 59,845 1.789 1.640 0 16 
Yield  58,756 2.659 1.390 0.0150 8.817 
Bond Buyer Index 59,847 4.332 0.463 3.270 6.010 
General fund revenue 59,811 5.168 25.93 0 171.1 
Ln of population 59,735 11.30 1.442 8.006 15.94 
More than three OPEB plans 60,078 0.00568 0.0751 0 1 
No rating 60,078 0.0107 0.103 0 1 
Missing rating 60,078 0.263 0.440 0 1 
Ln of par value 59,699 14.22 1.364 9.281 21.90 
Percentage of OPEB ARC contributed 47,666 0.574 0.530 0 3.968 
OPEB funded ratio 47,673 0.0484 0.127 0 0.666 
Percentage of pension ARC contributed 42,582 0.947 0.203 0 1.505 
Pension funded ratio 43,009 0.738 0.241 0 1.435 
Pension unfunded liabilities per capita 43,009 0.00135 0.00172 -0.00137 0.00949 
OPEB unfunded liabilities per capita 47,787 0.00158 0.00358 9.49e-07 0.0197 
      
Results of the Estimation 
Counties 
Table 4.4 shows the impact of OPEB funding on county government borrowing 
costs. Model 1 controls for percentage of OPEB ARC contributed only; model 2 controls 
for OPEB funded ratio only; and model 3 controls for both. Percentage of pension ARC 
contributed and funded ratio are controlled in the same way as that of OPEB. Comparing 
the results of model 1 and model 2 to model 3, it shows that the effects of key 
independent variables do not change materially. This suggests that the results are robust 
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with different modelling assumptions. Model 3 is preferred because it is less likely to 
suffer from omitted variable bias.  
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Table 4. 4 Impact of OPEB Funding on County Borrowing Costs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES model 1 model 2 model 3 
    
Percentage of OPEB ARC 
contributed 
-0.050**  -0.053** 
 (0.023)  (0.023) 
Percentage of pension ARC 
contributed 
-0.067***  -0.061** 
 (0.025)  (0.025) 
OPEB funded ratio  -0.146 -0.117 
  (0.099) (0.100) 
Pension funded ratio   -0.482*** -0.492*** 
  (0.127) (0.127) 
General obligation -0.191*** -0.201*** -0.199*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Refunding issue -0.070*** -0.074*** -0.073*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Insured  0.098*** 0.100*** 0.102*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
Competitive sale -0.234*** -0.232*** -0.237*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Callable  0.561*** 0.559*** 0.560*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ln of time to maturity 1.026*** 1.026*** 1.025*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Ln of par value 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Credit rating 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
No rating 0.273*** 0.271*** 0.269*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Missing rating 0.431*** 0.412*** 0.413*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Tax exemption  -0.766*** -0.759*** -0.771*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
Bond Buyer Index 0.608*** 0.611*** 0.606*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Unemployment rate -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Ln of income per capita 1.215*** 1.063*** 1.100*** 
 (0.237) (0.239) (0.240) 
Ln of population -0.669*** -0.686*** -0.697*** 
 (0.199) (0.199) (0.199) 
Direct debt per capita 0.048*** 0.035* 0.033* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
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Table 4.4 (Continued) 
General fund revenue per capita -1.402*** -1.445*** -1.468*** 
 (0.388) (0.389) (0.389) 
More than three OPEB plans 0.300*** 0.287*** 0.278*** 
 (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) 
Constant -12.428*** -10.214*** -10.369*** 
 (3.469) (3.507) (3.523) 
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,992 8,026 7,992 
R-squared 0.889 0.889 0.889 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As column (3) shows, the percentage of OPEB ARC contributed has a negative 
and statistically significant effect (p=0.05) on borrowing costs. This is consistent with the 
first hypothesis. Since the standard deviation of bond yield in the county sample is about 
1.42, the size of effect of this variable, about 0.05, is approximately 3.5 percent of one 
standard deviation of the dependent variable. In substantive terms, when county 
governments increase the annual contribute rate of their OPEB plans by 10 percentage 
points, the yields of their newly issued bonds decrease by 0.5 percentage points. Given 
that counties in the sample currently have low average percentage of ARC contributed 
(52%) for their OPEB plans, the sizes of changes in bond yields can be larger if they 
increase it beyond 10 percentage points in the future.  
Both variables measuring pension funding status show results consistent with the 
third and fourth hypotheses. As column (3) shows, percentage of pension ARC 
contributed has a negative and statistically significant effect (p=0.05) on county 
government borrowing costs. The size of the effect is about 0.06, close to that of 
percentage of OPEB ARC contributed. In addition, while the OPEB funded ratio shows 
no statistically significant effect, the pension funded ratio shows a negative and 
98 
 
statistically significant effect (p=0.01) on county government borrowing costs. The size 
of effect is about 0.5, ten times as large as that of percentage of pension ARC contributed. 
This implies that the long-term funding position of pension plans is more important than 
the short-term funding progress for bond pricing.  
Among the bond-level control variables with unclear expected signs, the variable 
insured has a positive and statistically significant effect (p=0.01) on borrowing costs. 
This suggests that, on average, insured bonds have lower credit quality than uninsured 
bonds even with bond insurance. In addition, ln of par value shows a positive and 
statistically significant effect (p=0.01). This indicates that bonds with larger issue sizes 
are associated with higher borrowing costs, which may result from the difficulty for 
underwriters to place such bonds in the market.  
Other control variables at the bond level show results as expected. Bonds that are 
callable, with longer time to maturity, with no or low credit ratings, and with missing 
information on credit ratings are associated with higher borrowing costs. The Bond Buyer 
Index is also positively associated with borrowing costs. On the other hand, general 
obligation bonds, refunding issues, bonds issued via competitive sale, and bonds qualified 
for federal and state tax exemption are correlated with lower borrowing costs.  
Among the government-level control variables, the variable ln of income per 
capita shows a positive and statistically significant effect (p=0.01) on borrowing costs. 
Thus, counties with higher level of personal income per capita have higher borrowing 
costs. This may result from tendency for these counties to issue more bonds, which may 
increase default risks. Because total debt outstanding is omitted in the sample due to data 
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availability and direct debt per capita is not a perfect substitute, this variable may carry 
over some impacts of total debts.  
Other control variables at the government level show results consistent with 
expectation. The sizes of general bonded debts are positively associated with borrowing 
costs. The sizes of general fund revenue and population are associated with lower 
borrowing costs. Counties with more than three OPEB plans but unmeasured OPEB 
information are associated with higher borrowing costs.  
Cities 
Table 4.5 shows the impacts of OPEB funding on borrowing costs of city 
governments. As for the county sample, three models are presented in columns (1), (2), 
and (3), respectively. Model 1 controls for OPEB and percentage of pension ARC 
contributed only, model 2 controls for OPEB and pension funded ratios only, and model 
3 controls for both. The results are consistent across three models, indicating the 
robustness of results with alternative model specifications. As for the county sample, 
model 3 is preferred.  
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Table 4. 5 Impact of OPEB Funding on City Borrowing Costs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES model 1 model 2 model 3 
    
Percentage of OPEB ARC 
contributed 
0.001  0.003 
 (0.008)  (0.008) 
Percentage of pension ARC 
contributed 
-0.087***  -0.081*** 
 (0.027)  (0.027) 
OPEB funded ratio  -0.105** -0.082* 
  (0.045) (0.045) 
Pension funded ratio  -0.073*** -0.063** 
  (0.024) (0.025) 
General obligation -0.483*** -0.480*** -0.485*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
Refunding issue -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.056*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Insured  -0.115*** -0.123*** -0.117*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Missing insured  0.029 0.030* 0.029 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Competitive sale  -0.168*** -0.169*** -0.166*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Callable 0.551*** 0.550*** 0.551*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln of time to maturity 1.007*** 1.006*** 1.007*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln of par value  0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Credit rating 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
No rating  0.120*** 0.124*** 0.119*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Missing rating 0.232*** 0.226*** 0.231*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Tax exemption -0.497*** -0.488*** -0.498*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Bond Buyer Index 0.610*** 0.613*** 0.610*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln of population -0.075*** -0.078*** -0.077*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
General fund revenue -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
More than three OPEB plans -0.239*** -0.240*** -0.239*** 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) 
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Constant -5.695*** -5.687*** -5.621*** 
 (0.247) (0.245) (0.248) 
City fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,630 34,018 33,630 
R-squared 0.878 0.878 0.878 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As column (3) shows, OPEB funded ratio has a negative and statistically 
significant effect (p=0.1) on city government borrowing costs. This is consistent with the 
second hypothesis. The size of effect is about 0.08, while the standard deviation of bond 
yields in the city sample is about 1.39. Thus, this size of effect is about 6 percent of one 
standard deviation of the dependent variable. This means that, on average, bond yields 
paid by city governments decrease by 0.8 percentage points when the overall funded ratio 
of their OPEB plans increases by 10 percentage points. In the city sample, the average 
OPEB funded ratio is about 5 percent. This implies that the change in borrowing costs of 
city governments can be substantial if they increase the funded ratios more in the future.  
Both measures of funding status of pension plans show results consistent with the 
third and fourth hypotheses. In column (3), percentage of pension ARC contributed 
shows a negative and statistically significant effect (p=0.01) on borrowing costs. The size 
of effect is about 0.08, indicating that bond yields paid by city governments decrease by 
0.8 percentage points when the percentage of ARC contributed increases by 10 
percentage points. In addition, pension funded ratio shows a negative and statistically 
significant effect (p=0.05).  The size of effect is about 0.06, slightly smaller than that of 
OPEB funded ratio.  
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Control variables at both the bond and the government levels show expected 
results. Bond characteristics that are associated with higher borrowing costs of city 
governments include longer time to maturity, being callable, lower credit rating, no credit 
rating, missing credit rating, and high market-wide interest rates in the week of issuing. 
In contrast, general obligation bonds, refunding issues, insured bonds, bonds issued 
through competitive sale, and tax-exempt bonds are correlated with lower borrowing 
costs. At the government level, larger sizes of general fund revenues and population are 
associated with lower borrowing costs. Besides, counties with more than three OEPB 
plans but unmeasured OPEB information have lower borrowing costs.  
Robustness Check 
As an alternative to funded ratio, unfunded liabilities are a well-established 
measure of long-term funding positions of OPEB or pension plans. Unfunded liabilities 
are calculated as total liabilities minus total assets. To test the robustness of the main 
findings, long-term funding position is measured by unfunded liabilities. Because 
unfunded liabilities will be higher when funded ratios are lower, they should have 
opposite signs. Unfunded liabilities are scaled by population size. To facilitate 
interpretation, unfunded liabilities per capita is measured in hundred dollars for county 
OPEB plans, in dollars for county pension plans, and in million dollars for city OPEB 
and pension plans.  
Table 4.6 shows the results for the county sample when long-term funding status 
is measured by unfunded liabilities per capita. As column (1) of Table 4.6 shows, OPEB 
unfunded liabilities per capita have a positive and statistically significant effect (p=0.1) 
on borrowing costs. While this is consistent with expectation, it loses statistical 
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significance in column (2) when percentage of ARC contributed are controlled. More 
assuring is the negative and statistically significant effect (p=0.05) of percentage of 
OPEB ARC contributed in column (2), which is robust with alternative measures of long-
term OPEB funding status. 
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Table 4. 6 Impact of OPEB Funding on County Borrowing Costs: Alternative Measure 
(Unfunded Liabilities) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES model 1 model 2 
   
Percentage of OPEB ARC contributed  -0.046** 
  (0.023) 
Percentage of pension ARC 
contributed 
 -0.075*** 
  (0.025) 
OPEB unfunded liabilities per capita 1.860* 2.089 
 (1.001) (2.421) 
Pension unfunded liabilities per capita 0.066*** 0.064** 
 (0.017) (0.030) 
General obligation  -0.308*** -0.201*** 
 (0.021) (0.031) 
Refunding issue -0.130*** -0.072*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) 
Insured  -0.005 0.094** 
 (0.022) (0.037) 
Competitive sale -0.196*** -0.234*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) 
Callable  0.592*** 0.560*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) 
Ln of time to maturity 1.011*** 1.025*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) 
Ln of par value 0.020*** 0.024*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Credit rating 0.057*** 0.090*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
No rating 0.253*** 0.269*** 
 (0.035) (0.040) 
Missing rating 0.495*** 0.417*** 
 (0.038) (0.054) 
Tax exemption -0.719*** -0.771*** 
 (0.020) (0.028) 
Bond Buyer Index 0.635*** 0.603*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) 
Unemployment rate -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.013) 
Ln of income per capita 0.534** 1.106*** 
 (0.221) (0.245) 
Ln of population -0.190*** -0.639*** 
 (0.034) (0.195) 
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Table 4.6 (Continued) 
Direct debt per capita 0.039*** 0.050*** 
 (0.011) (0.018) 
General fund revenue per capita -0.463*** -1.355*** 
 (0.075) (0.380) 
More than three OPEB plans 0.499*** 0.304*** 
 (0.054) (0.078) 
Constant -10.813*** -11.587*** 
 (2.563) (3.524) 
County fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 15,209 7,992 
R-squared 0.878 0.889 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Similarly, the results for percentage of pension ARC contributed and unfunded 
liabilities per capita are consistent with expectations. Pension unfunded liabilities per 
capita shows a positive and statistically significant effect (p=0.05) in both models 
presented in Table 4.6. Percentage of pension ARC contributed remains negative and 
statistically significant (p=0.01) when long-term funding status of pension plans is 
measured differently. This suggests that the main findings of the impacts of pension 
funding on county government borrowing costs are robust with alternative measures.  
Table 4.7 shows the results for the city sample when long-term funding status is 
measured by unfunded liabilities per capita. Neither percentage of OPEB ARC 
contributed nor OPEB unfunded liabilities per capita show statistically significant results. 
In addition, while percentage of pension ARC contributed remains negative and 
statistically significant (p=0.01) in model 2, pension unfunded liabilities per capita show 
no statistically significant effect. There can be three explanations for the changes of 
results. First, the null effects may indicate that OPEB funding status and long-term 
pension funding status have small impacts on city borrowing costs. In other words, the 
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main results in Table 4.5 are not robust with the alternative measure of long-term funding 
positions. Second, measurement errors of unfunded liabilities per capita may have biased 
the results toward zero. Third, while funded ratio measures funding status only, unfunded 
liabilities per capita captures population sizes in addition to funding status. This 
conceptual difference suggests that the robustness test may provide only indirect 
evidence for the main finding using funded ratio as a measure of funding status.  
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Table 4. 7 Impact of OPEB Funding on City Borrowing Costs: Alternative Measure 
(Unfunded Liabilities) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES model 1 model 2 
   
Percentage of OPEB ARC contributed  0.001 
  (0.008) 
Percentage of pension ARC contributed  -0.089*** 
  (0.027) 
OPEB unfunded liabilities per capita 2.756 2.680 
 (2.405) (2.410) 
Pension unfunded liabilities per capita -3.825 -3.455 
 (3.846) (3.858) 
General obligation -0.481*** -0.483*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) 
Refunding issue -0.062*** -0.056*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Insured  -0.117*** -0.117*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Missing insured 0.030* 0.029 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Competitive sale  -0.167*** -0.169*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
Callable  0.550*** 0.551*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln of time to maturity 1.006*** 1.007*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln of par value 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Credit rating 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
No rating 0.129*** 0.122*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
Missing rating 0.226*** 0.231*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
Tax exemption -0.488*** -0.497*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) 
Bond Buyer Index 0.612*** 0.611*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln of population -0.080*** -0.079*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
General fund revenue -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
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Table 4.7 (Continued) 
More than three OPEB plans -0.240*** -0.238*** 
 (0.073) (0.073) 
Constant -5.713*** -5.639*** 
 (0.251) (0.254) 
City fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 34,132 33,630 
R-squared 0.878 0.878 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Conclusion and Discussion 
Under GASB 45, information about OPEB funding became available to the 
municipal bond market for the first time. This study shows that the newly disclosed 
OPEB information by county and city governments is incorporated in bond pricing. 
Overall, improvements of OPEB funding reduce borrowing costs of counties and cities. 
For county governments, an increase of one percentage point in OPEB percentage of 
ARC contributed is associated with a decrease of bond yields of about 0.05 percentage 
points. For city governments, as funded ratios of OPEB plans increase by one percentage 
point, their bond yields decrease by about 0.08 percentage points. This suggests that the 
municipal bond market is efficient in pricing municipal bonds by absorbing OPEB 
information.  
This study models the impacts of both OPEB and pension funding on local 
government borrowing costs. Pension funding shows even stronger negative effects on 
borrowing costs of county and city governments. For both counties and cities, each of the 
two variables of percentage of ARC contributed and funded ratio shows negative effects 
on borrowing costs. These results are consistent with the findings of previous studies 
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(Raman and Wilson, 1990; Martell, Kioko, and Moldogaziev, 2013) that pension funding 
influences borrowing costs or credit ratings of local governments.  
The results are generally robust. First, especially for the county sample, the main 
results of OPEB and pension funding are robust with the alternative measure of long-term 
funding status, unfunded liabilities per capita. Second, the results are consistent when 
controlling for percentage of ARC contributed and funded ratios separately or 
simultaneously. Third, the results of OPEB and pension funding are robust with two 
important governmental forms, including counties and cities. Given the many differences 
between counties and cities, this consistency of results provides additional support for the 
main findings.  
The funding status of OPEB and pension plans, or the two main components of 
postemployment benefits, is likely to be interdependent. It is thus an improvement over 
existing studies to estimate the impacts of OPEB and pension funding in the same model. 
Compared to OPEB funding, stronger effects of pension funding imply that pension 
funding is more important to bond pricing. This is reasonable given that pension funding 
is a legal obligation of local governments, while OPEB liabilities are sometimes regarded 
as “soft” liabilities (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2013). The municipal bond market may have 
discounted the value of unfunded OPEB liabilities by the likelihood of defaults by local 
governments.  
The results have significant policy implications. On one hand, they show that the 
municipal bond market rewards OPEB funding. While local governments may face high 
costs of implementing GASB 45, this paper shows that the benefits of compliance can be 
nontrivial savings in borrowing costs. A similar case can be made for pension funding. 
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On the other hand, they show that the content of information released under GASB 45 
matters for municipal bond pricing. This is consistent with the findings of information 
disclosed under GASB 34 on the municipal bond market (Reck and Wilson, 2014). This 
shows not only efficiency of the municipal bond market but also the effectiveness of 
efforts to improve financial transparency by GASB and local governments.  
In this study, the sampled counties and cities repeatedly participate in the GFOA’s 
award programs between 1999 and 2014. Moreover, this study focuses on the counties 
and cities that have disclosed positive assets and liabilities of OPEB and pension plans. 
This effectively omits the selection problem that local governments decide whether to 
disclose OPEB or pension information. Compared to an average county or city, the 
sampled ones are more likely to comply with GASB statements because they have been 
chosen to win the GFOA’s award program in financial reporting. Indeed, only a handful 
counties or cities with OPEB or pension plans choose not to disclose. Consequently, the 
results should not be severely biased as estimates of “treatment effects of the treated” 
because of the omission of this selection problem.  
Nonetheless, this benefit of sampling strategy comes at the costs of limiting 
external validity of the findings to counties or cities dedicated to higher quality of 
financial management or potentially qualified for the GFOA’s program. Future studies 
may focus on a random sample of counties and cities to improve external validity, though 
selection bias resulting from whether to disclose and data availability could become more 
severe concerns. In addition, future studies can test the impacts of OPEB funding on 
borrowing costs of other types of local governments like school districts and state 
governments.  
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